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THE ROLE OF THE ACCESS DOCTRINE IN THE
REGULATION OF THE MASS MEDIA: A CRITICAL
REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT
DAVID L. LANGEt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Among the issues which confront the American mass media, surely
few are more important than the issues posed by the question of access:
who finally shall decide which voices will be heard, which questions
raised, and which events and matters covered in the nation's press?
In broadest terms, the access question is nothing less than an inquiry into the proper structure and purpose of the American press.
More recently, however, the question has arisen in the narrower context
of immediate confrontations between the owners of the media and their
gatekeepers,' on the one hand, and individual members of the public on
the other. Thus, a group of businessmen organized against the war in
Vietnam demand the right to air their views in sixty-second broadcast
editorials.' Members of a clothing workers union propose to buy a page
of advertising space in a metropolitan daily newspaper to protest the
importation of foreign-manufactured clothing.3 Individual citizens insist that they be allowed to use the origination facilities of their community's cable television system to express their personal views on any
subject.' In each case proponents of a point of view seek direct access
to a communications medium that they do not generally control. If
access is to be granted, some accommodation obviously is required
among interests that are likely to conflict.
With increasing frequency, scholars, courts and regulators have
proposed that the accommodation be implemented through an affirmative right of access in the proponents as against the owners and managtAssociate Professor of Law and Adjunct Associate Professor of Communications, Policy, and
Public Affairs, Duke University.
'The "gatekeepers" metaphor was first employed by David Manning White is his classic study
of the screening role of editors. See The "Gate Keeper": A Case Study in the Selection of News,
JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 383-90 (1950).
'Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd
sub non. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973).
'Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 973 (1971).
'See generally Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 419 (1972).
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ers of the media enterprise.5 The proposals reflect a growing uneasiness
5

The access question has inspired a considerable literature. The weight of opinion in the law
reviews favors some form of limited access. A majority of the access proposals have been offered
in the context of the broadcast and cable media, but there is substantial support for access to the
print media as well. See Barron, An Emerging FirstAmendment Right of Access to the Media?,
37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Barron, Access-The Only Choicefor the Media?, 48 TEXAS L.
REV. 766 (1970); Botein, Clearing the Airwaves for Access, 59 A.B.A.J. 38 (1973); Botein, The
Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Regulations: A First Step Towards Creation of
a Right ofAccess to the Mass Media, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 294 (1969); Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade:Access to Radio and Television, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 723 (1972); Clark
& Hutchison, Self-Censorship in Broadcasting- The Cowardly Lions, 18 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1972); Drabelle & Taylor, The President, The Fairness Doctrine, and PoliticalAccess to the Broadcast
Media, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 73 (1970): Firestein, Red Lion and the FairnessDoctrine: Regulation
of Broadcasting"In the Public Interest," 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 807 (1969); Johnson & Westen, A
Twentieth-Century Soap-box: The Right to PurchaseRadio and Television Time, 57 VA. L. REV.
574 (1971); Mallamud, The Broadcast Licensee as Fiduciary: Toward the Enforcement of
Discretion, 1973 DUKE L.J. 89; Malone, Broadcasting, The Reluctant Dragon: Will the First
Amendment Right of Access End the Suppressing of ControversialIdeas?, 5 U. MIcH. J.LAW
REFORM 194 (1972); Scanlon, The FTC, the FCC,and the "Counter-Ad' Controversy:An Invitalion to 'Let's You and Him Fight?', 5 ANTITRUST LAW & ECON. REV. 43 (1971); Zack, FC.C.
and the FairnessDoctrine, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 579 (1970); Comment, The BroadcastMedia and
the First Amendment: A Redefinition, 22 AM. L. REV. 180 (1972); Comment, And Now a Word
Against Our Sponsor: Extending the FCC's FairnessDoctrine to Advertising, 60 CALIF. L. REV.
1416 (1972); Note, A FairBreak ForControversialSpeakers: Limitationsof the FairnessDoctrine
and the Need for Individual Access, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 532 (1971); Note, Media and the
FirstAmendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867, 904-07 (1972); Note, Broadcastingand the
Right of Access to Public Forums: Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 6 GA.
L. REV. 208 (1971); Comment, From the FCC's Fairness Doctrine to Red Lion's Fiduciary
Principle,5 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIE. L. REV. 89 (1970); Note, The Duty of Newspapers to
Accept Political Advertising-An Attack on Tradition, 44 IND. L.J. 222 (1969); Comment,
Freedom of Speech and the Individual's Right of Access to the Airwaves, 1970 LAW & Soc.
ORDER 424; Note, The Public Domain and a Right of Access: Affect Upon the BroadcastMedia,
3 LOYOLA U.L.A.L. REV. 451 (1970); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: The Right of Access to the
Press, 50 NEB. L. REV. 120 (1971); Note, Freedom of Expression in the Media: The Public's Clahn
for a Right of Access, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 151 (1972); Note, We Pick 'Em, You Watch 'Ena: First
Amendment Rights of Television Viewers, 43 S.CAL. L. REV. 826 (1970); Note, "Public Interest,"
"Fairness," And the FirstAmendment: A Broadcaster'sDilemma, 4 SUFFOLK L. REV. 509 (1970).
Note, Resolving the Free Speech-Free Press Dichotomy: Access to the Press Through
Advertising, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 293 (1969); 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 870 (1971); 85 HARV. L. REV.
689 (1972); 15 S.D.L. REV. 172 (1970); 24 VAND. L. REV. 131 (1971). There is, in addition, a
substantial body of complementary writings which can be classified as neither clearly "for" nor
"against" the proposals for access, but which nonetheless offer useful insights into the areas. See
generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 653-71 (1970); Barron, In
Defense of "Fairness":A First Amendment Rationalefor Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37
U. COLO. L. REV. 31 (1964); Botein, supra note 4; Cohn, Access to Television to Rebut the
President of the United States: An Analysis and Proposal,45 TEMP. L.Q. 141 (1972); Houser, The
Fairness Doctrine-An Historical Perspective, 47 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 550 (1972); Jaffe, Tie
Fairness Doctrine, Equal Time, Reply to PersonalAttacks, and the Local Service Obligation:
Implicatons of Technological Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 550 (1968); Johnson, Freedom to Create:
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with the apparent concentration of power in the American media and a
corresponding concern for the viability of effective and diverse public

debate.
In their most extreme form, the proposals have called for recognition of access to the press as "a new First Amendment right. ' 7 But the

courts have not yet accepted these proposals. In particular, private
newspaper publishers have argued successfully that the first amendment

ordinarily protects them in their traditional right to edit the contents of
their publications. 8 Thus, the clothing workers either must persuade the

publishers to print their editorial advertisements or look elsewhere to
find an outlet for their views.
Broadcasters, on the other hand, have not enjoyed the editorial
autonomy of the publishers. Unlike publishers, broadcasters have long
been subject to the "fairness doctrine," the requirement that they pro-

vide a balanced treatment of controversial public issues? To be sure,
The Implications of Anti Trust Policy for Television Programming Content, 8 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 11 (1970); Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open"-A Note on Free Speech and the
Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 289 (1968); Putz, Fairnessand Commercial Advertising: A
Review and a Proposal,6 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 215 (1972); Symposium, The FCC's Role in
TV ProgrammingRegulation, 14 VILL. L. REV. 629 (1969); Comment, A ConstitutionalRemedy
For the HighCost of Broadcastand Newspaper Advertising in PoliticalCampaigns,60 CALIF. L.
REV. 1371 (1972); Note, The First Amendment and Regulation of Television News, 72 COLUM.
L. REV. 746 (1972); Note, Cable Television and the FirstAmendment, 71 CoLUM. L. REV. 1008
(1971); Note, The Public Interest in Balanced ProgrammingContent; The Casefor FCC Regulation of Broadcasters' Format Changes, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 933 (1972); Note, Morality and
the BroadcastMedia: A ConstitutiohalAnalysis of FCC Regulatory Standards,84 HARV. L. REV.
664 (1971); Note, Frontiers of Fairness in Broadcasting, 22 S.C.L. REV. 208 (1970); Note, The
Listener's Right to Hearin Broadcasting,22 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1970); Comment, The Broadcast
Industry: The Commercial Television Licensee and the EditorialFunction, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 683
(1972); 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 447 (1969); 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 370, 448 (1972).
'See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5, at
1644-47, 1678; Johnson & Westen, supra note 5 at 606.
'Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5.
"See, e.g., Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971);
Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
973 (1971); Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ala. 1971), affd on othergrounds,
458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972); Resident Participation, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo.
1971). But cf. Tornillo v. The Miami Herald Publishing Co., No. 43,009 (Fla. Sup. Ct., filed July
18, 1973), rehearingdenied, Oct. 10, 1973.
'The fairness doctrine was conceived in the FCC's 1946 "Blue Book," within which the
Commission promulgated the principle that stations must reserve broadcast time for discussion of
public issues. FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946). The doctrine reached a maturity of sorts in 1949, when the Commission issued a report regarding editorializing by licensees. FCC, Editorializingby Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Attacked
as a violation of the precepts of the first amendment, the doctrine was nonetheless held to be
constitutional in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The fairness doctrine
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they have retained a degree of independence: while the fairness doctrine

has called for balanced treatment of the issues, the broadcasters have
been relatively free to define in the first instance the issues that they

would treat.'" But their discretion has been largely circumscribed by the
overriding requirement that they provide service "in the public interest""-a command which the Federal Communications Commission
has interpreted to mean that broadcasters must attempt to identify and
treat issues of particular concern to their audience.12 Moreover, the
fairness doctrine contemplates-and in some cases demands'-that
the balance which is required of broadcast licensees be achieved through
opportunities for direct expression by interested members of the public. 4 Thus, we have grown accustomed to the broadcast editorial followed in turn by a reply from some "responsible" spokesman for another point of view. This right to reply is, of course, a species of access
even though it arises as a result of some position taken initially by the
licensee.

Meanwhile, cable television audiences in the so-called "top one
hundred markets" in the country are the beneficiaries of a maze of
recent FCC regulations intended in part to ensure public access to CTV
has been the subject of extensive commentary. For a useful discussion of its general development,
see Houser, supra note 5.
"0 See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973), in which Chief Justice
Burger observes:
The regulatory scheme evolved slowly, but very early the licensee's role developed
in terms of a "public trustee" charged with the duty of fairly and impartially informing
the listening and viewing public. In this structure the Commission acts in essence as an
"overseer," but the initialandprimaryresponsibilityfor fairness, balance and objectivity
rests with the licensee. . . . [S]o long as a licensee meets its "public trustee" obligation
to provide balanced coverage of issues and events, it has broad discretion to decide how
that obligation will be met.
Id. at 2093-94 (emphasis added).
"Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 309 (1970). The congressional standard of
"public interest, convenience and necessity" runs throughout the Act as it applies to broadcasting.
2
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377-79 (1969), in which the Court
stated:
There is a twofold duty laid down by the FCC's decisions and described by the 1949
Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). The broadcaster must give adequate coverage to public issues . . . and coverage must be fair in
that it accurately reflects the opposing views. . . . The statutory authority of the FCC
to promulgate these regulations derives from the mandate to the "Commission from
time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires" to promulgate "such
rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions . . . as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter ...
" 47 U.S.C. § 303 and § 303(r).
11395 U.S. at 373-75.
"See Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 222-23 (1970).
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channels. 5 In most of these markets, cable operators are required to
originate programming for a "substantial part of the broadcast day"; 16
this programming is subject to the fairness doctrine and thus incorporates its reply provisions. 17 But cable operators in these markets are also
required to dedicate certain channels to the public on terms which recognize affirmative, individual rights of public access entirely independent

of any position taken by the operators. 8 The result is to force cable
systems to operate pro tanto as common carriers.

Recently, it appeared that a more immediate right of access to the
broadcast media might also be required. In a sweeping 1971 decision, a
panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that

the first amendment forbids broadcast licensees to reject all paid editorial advertising, at least in cases in which commercial advertising was

otherwise accepted. 9 But that tentaive acceptance of an affirmative
right of access was short-lived. In CBS v. Democratic National

Committee,"0 a majority of the Supreme Court has held that the first
amendment does not impose this requirement on broadcasters operating

under present broadcast regulatory policies.
For those who have doubted the wisdom of an enforceable right of
access to the mass media 2"-and I am among them for reasons I shall
1547 C.F.R. §§ 73.201, .205, .209, .213, .215, .217, .221, .225, .251 (1972).
1647 C.F.R. § 73.201(b) (1972).

"See 47 C.F.R. § 73.209 (1972); Public Notice, Applicability of the FairnessDoctrine in the
Handling of ControversialIssues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964).
1847 C.F.R. §§ 73.25l(4)-(8), .251(10)(ii)-(11) (1972).
"Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd
sub nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973).
2093 S. Ct. 2080 (1973).
2
While not all of the following authorities have considered the access proposals specifically
or at comprehensive length, the tenor of their observations is generally at odds with the concept
of an enforceable right of access. See 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
624-50 (1947); Blake, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: Fairnessand the Emperor's New
Clothes, 23 FED. COM. B.J. 75 (1969); Daniel, Right of Access to Mass Media-Government
Obligation to Enforce First Amendment?, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 783 (1970); Jaffe, The Editorial
Responsibility of the Broadcaster:Reflections on Fairnessand Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768
(1972); Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW & ECON. 15
(1967); Marks, Broadcastingand Censorship:FirstAmendment Theory After Red Lion, 38 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 974 (1970); Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment. Observations on 40
Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967); Sullivan, Editorials and
Controversy: The Broadcaster'sDilemma, 32 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 719 (1964); Note, Concepts of
the BroadcastMedia Under the First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal,47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 83 (1972); Note, Newspaper Regulation nd the Public Interest: The Unmasking of a Myth,
32 U. PITT. L. REV. 595 (1971); Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, 57 VA. L. REV. 636
(1971).
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explain at some length in this article-the decision in Democratic National Committee is encouraging. And yet it clearly does not end the
battle for a right of access to the broadcast media. On the contrary, a
majority of the Court decides merely that the broadcast media present
unique regulatory problems which are primarily within the province of
Congress and the Federal Communications Commission;"2 that the
Communications Act of 1934 does not itself impose common carrier
status on broadcast licensees; 3 and that, whether or not broadcast
licensees are engaged in governmental action, they need not accept
unwanted editorial announcements unless they are required to do so by
2
In the view of the majority, balanced coverage of public
the FCCY.
issues under a system of editorial trusteeship is an adequate alternative
to a right of access in individuals.25 The question whether the FCC itself
may impose a right of access without violating the first amendment is
not actually decided, although a majority of the Court rather clearly
supposes that it may. 2 Meanwhile, the majority continues to appear
untroubled by the limitations imposed on broadcasters' discretion by the
fairness doctrine and, in dictum, actually appears to welcome the relatively recent restraints on cable television.27
Other dicta in the case suggest that a majority of the Court would
find efforts to establish a right of access to the print media substantially
more difficult to approve.28 Traditional first amendment thinking has
long held that the print media are unlike the broadcast media in that
the latter are uniquely scarce: 2 anyone may establish a printing press;
"CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (1973).
13Id. at 2087-92.
2
'Id. at 2096-101, 2108-09.
2Jd. at 2097-98.
26
See id. at 2100.
2See id. at 2100-01.
2sChief Justice Burger, supported by Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, makes this comment:
"The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political, social, and economic
views is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and
hence advertisers-to assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors
and publishers." Id. at 2094. And Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, notes in his dissenting opinion that: "The newspaper industry is not extensively regulated and, indeed, in light of the
differences between the electronic and printed media, such regulation would violate the First
Amendment with respect to newspapers." Id. at 2126 n.12.
2
1The most frequently quoted statement of the scarcity rationale was set forth by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter: "Unlike other modes of expression, radio is not available to all. That is its unique
characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental
regulation." NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). While other theories of broadcast
regulation have been offered-including, notably, the concept of public ownership of the air-
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broadcast frequencies, on the other hand, are drawn from the limited

electromagnetic spectrum and therefore must be regulated to avoid chaotic interference. 3 Thus a right of access to the broadcast media might
be justified as a concomitant of an otherwise necessary regulatory structure. Access to the print media, on the other hand, would involve a more
fundamental first amendmen, conflict. Although the access proponents

have strongly questioned this traditional orientation on grounds which
I shall discuss more fully, the Supreme Court itself has never squarely

faced the issue. It now appears, however, that it may soon have an
opportunity to do so. In Tornillo v. The Miami Herald Publishing
Co., 31 which followed within weeks the decision in Democratic Na-

tional Committee, a majority of the Florida Supreme Court has upheld
a statute3 2 which, in effect, requires newspapers to give "equal space"

to political candidates who are attacked either in news reports or on the
editorial pages. In strictest terms, the Florida statute does not grant a

full right of access. It more nearly resembles the FCC's fairness doctrine
or, more nearly still, the "equal time" provisions of section 315 of the

Communications Act of 1934. 33 Under the equal space statute, no one
has a right to reply who is not a political candidate and who has not
first been attacked. One needs no special insight, however, to see that
the statute cannot be applied to privately owned newspapers unless quite
basic assumptions about the traditional first amendment position of the
print media are altered. If they are, it seems altogether possible that,
waves-it is the scarcity argument which has enjoyed the widest acceptance. See, e.g., Note,
Concepts of the Broadcast Media Under the First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal,
supra note 21, at 88-89; Note, Newspaper Regulation and the Public Interest: The Unmasking of
a Myth, supra note 21, at 601-03.
"See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-86 (1969); NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-17 (1943); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474
(1940). More recently, the Chief Justice has observed: "We have noted that prior to the passage
of the Radio Act of 1927. . . broadcasting was marked by chaos. The unregulated and burgeoning
private use of the new media in the 1920's had resulted in an intolerable situation demanding
" CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 St. Ct. 2080, 2087 (1973).
congressional action ..
"No. 43,009 (Fla. Supp. Ct., filed July 18, 1973), rehearingdenied Oct. 10, 1973.
3

1FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (Supp. 1972).
347 U.S.C. § 315 (1964). It is true, of course, that the fairness doctrine and the earlier equal

time provisions are distinct from each other. Yet the underlying rationale-fairness and balance-is essentially the same for both, and the commission has regarded the fairness doctrine as
having been ratified by Congressional amendments to the equal time provisions in 1959. See
Robinson, supra note 21, at 131-36. While there is room for substantial debate concerning the
specific relationship between fairness and equal time, most observers of broadcast regulation would
probably agree that the conceptual genesis of the fairness doctrine is more clearly expressed in
§ 315 than in other provisions of the Act. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
379-86 (1969).
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just as the fairness doctrine has evolved from the original equal time
provisions, a similar regulatory scheme may evolve in the print media.
It is worth noting that Professor Jerome Barron, who has been the
leading proponent of an affirmative right of access, has published a new
book coincidentally with the decisions in Democratic National
Committee and Tornillo. In Freedom of the Pressfor Whom?34 Professor Barron renews the arguments for an affirmative first amendment
right of access which he has been making persuasively during the past
half-dozen years. The book has been written with his customary vigor
and is altogether a useful and important restatement of the basic position of the access proponents. Its appearance at this time suggests,
again, that the arguments for access are alive and well, however slightly
they may have been set back by Democratic National Committee.
Obviously, both Democratic National Committee and Tornillo
deserve extended analysis. But they can best be understood against an
even more extensive review of the access question itself. That review
appropriately begins with an appreciation of the case for access.
II.

THE CASE FOR AccEss

The typical argument for an affirmative right of access to the mass
media begins essentially as follows: it is desirable to promote widespread debate on matters of public importance and to provide an opportunity for the expression of all points of view-not merely those which
are in the mainstream of conventional thought. 5 The first amendment
was intended to ensure the realization of these goals through what has
popularly been called the "market-place of ideas."36 Unhappily, whatever success we may once have had in securing effective public debate,
it is "romantic nonsense" now to suggest that there is an adequate

market-place in the privately owned mass media. 37 To the contrary, the
mass media have become vast repositories of privilege and what is
worse, power.38 Today's media, it is suggested, are all-pervasive, with
3

'J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973).
'-See Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5, at 1641.
Most of the pro-access articles collected in note 5, supra, also make this point.
3IThe concept of the first amendment as the guardian of a "market-place" was articulated
originally by Mr. Justice Holmes; e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
37
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5, at 1642-43.

3'Characteristic of the access proponents' attitudes on this point are the following remarks:
Radio and Television . . . represent the most effective single forum for presenting any
idea to a national audience, and are generally recognized as one of the most persuasive
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enormous capabilities to influence, to suggest, to shape articulated

thought-in short, to lead us into error at the will or through the sheer
indifference of their owners.

9

Indeed, the argument runs, the owners

and managers of the media have become the real sources of suppression
and censorship in America, with perhaps an even greater capacity to
suppress thought than the government itself.4"
The proponents of an access doctrine conclude, therefore, that
something must be done to create new and effective forums for free

expression in the media. 41 Whether a right of access is predicated directly upon the first amendment or whether it is derived instead from

other sources, this much is clear to the proponents: traditional first
amendment arguments in favor of media owners must yield to the larger

interest of the public in free expression. 42 A first amendment intended
to prevent suppression of thought and to foster a climate in which its
expression may flourish can no more tolerate private censorship than
public censorship. What must be attacked is the power to censor in
43
whatever form it may appear.

influences in our culture. Because of its tremendous ability to impart ideas and influence
thought, it is vital that access to the electronic mass communications medium not be
controlled by a relatively small group.
Comment, Freedom of Speech and the Individual's Right of Access to the Airwaves, supra note
5, at 425 (footnotes omitted); see e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, supra note 5, at 1644-47; Note, Freedom of Expression in the Media: The Public's Claim
For a Right of Access. supra note 5, at 151.
"Former Federal Communications Commissioner Nicholas Johnson has observed:
To place control of the broadcast media in the hands of a few gives them an inordinate
amount of political, economic and social power. . . Further, a media chain wields
enormous national political power. . . . Democracies can only function with an informed and responsible electorate. But if the flow of information to that electorate is
distorted or inhibited by private concentrations of control, then the democratic decisionmaking process will cease to function.
Johnson, Freedom to Create: The Implications ofAnti Trust Policy for Television Programming
Content, supra note 5, at 19-20. Commissioner Johnson does not stand alone in his perceptions of
the media. See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5,
at 1660; Clark & Hutchison, supra note 5, at 2.
4
1E.g., Johnson & Westen, supra note 5, at 604; Comment, The BroadcastMedia and the First
Amendment: A Redefinition, supra note 5, at 218-19.
"See. e.g., Barron, An Emerging FirstAmendment Right ofAccess to the Media?,supra note
5, at 509; Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5, at 1678;
Clark & Hutchison, supra note 5, at 7.
42
See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5, at
1678. Mallamud, supra note 5, at 127-33; Note, The Public Domain and a Right ofAccess: Affect
Upon the Broadcast Media, supra note 5, at 474.
43
See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5, at
1663, 1675 1678.
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The arguments summarized here are in many ways persuasive.
There are elements in the major premises which seem clear enough to
amount to common ground. For example, individual participation in the
democratic process and, more broadly, in the inquiry after truth is
surely desirable and in some measure provided for by the first amendment. If little else is clear about the first amendment, this proposition
at least is implicit in all of the decisions which have considered the
meaning of freedom of speech and press. But the issue posed by the
proposals for access is whether the right to participate is sufficiently
secured if protected against suppression by the state or whether, instead,
participation ought affirmatively to be provided for. Neither the arguments nor the cases which have considered the problem have resolved
this issue. I suggest that this ultimate failure results in large part from
the initial difficulty in making out the case for access.
A.

Access as a function of the "market-place myth."

The arguments for access are at their least persuasive when they
rely on some aspect of the "market-place myth,"4 the notion that the
first amendment was intended to create a market-place of ideas. Indeed,
Professor Barron has dismissed the concept of the market-place as
"romantic," a "banality." 45 I agree. Yet a careful reading of his arguments in support of access suggests that he is himself a victim of the
market-place myth. Thus, he argues that the purposes of the first
amendment can be realized only if the media are made to become
"effective forum [s] for expression of divergent opinion."4 The difficulty
is that his "effective forums" are really just another version of the
"market-place of ideas." Perhaps the first amendment ought to be read
as ensuring affirmative opportunities for effective public discussion. But
that it is itself the question and surely one is not permitted to answer it
by defining it away.
We may readily agree that public debate, "uninhibited, robust and
wide-open,' '47 ought to be permitted. As Professor Glen Robinson has
"The phrase appears in chapter five of Media Task Force, National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence, IX Mass Media and Violence 67 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
MASS MEDIA
45

and

VIOLENCE].

Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5, at 1641-43,

1649.
"Id. at 1678.
"This phrase, which came to be a kind of talisman for the Warren Court's approach to first

amendment theory, was coined by Mr. Justice Brennan in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
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observed, however, that does not mean that there is any intrinsic value
in babel. 8 Diversity of opinion is not the necessary goal of the first
amendment. On the contrary, diverse points of view may be tolerated
not because diversity itself is prized, but rather because the first amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues than through any sort of authoritative
selection."49 Of course, this means that views which do not reflect the
conventional wisdom are entitled to expression, as against authoritative
suppression, but the goal remains the same: conclusions, not a multitude
of tongues.
If the first amendment protects against the suppression of ideas, it
follows that a market-place of sorts may emerge. It does not follow that
a market-place necessarily will emerge or that if it does the result will
seem fair or balanced. Most clearly it does not follow that a balanced
market-place ought to be established. The question is entirely fair, and
its answer may even seem clear on other grounds, but it is not answered
by proposals for effective public forums. The question remains whether
the market-place can or ought to be anything more than accident or
myth.
B.

Access and the imaginary past.

It might be unnecessary to devote space to the task of debunking
the market-place myth if the notion of a balanced market-place were
not so much a part of a larger notion that once upon a time the press
stood uncorrupted, above venality and self-service, free to act as "the
champion of new ideas and the watch dog against government abuse. ' ' 0
Together, the market-place myth and this idealized conception of our
heritage of free expression have provided a convenient background
against which to present the arguments for access. It is convenient, and
it is also largely misleading.
Set against this background, the access arguments have acquired a
kind of spurious dignity. The suggestion is made that access is the only
way to regain the "equilibrium" in the market-place which "changes in
254, 270 (1964); see Kalven, supra note 5.
"See Robinson, supra note 21.
"Associated Press v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.), affd,

326 U.S. i (1945).
"°Forewordto Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, supra note 5, at
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."I' Access is recom-

mended, in other words, as the late Twentieth Century response to
forces which have worked a new and dangerous imbalance in the
market-place of ideas. Thus access is presented as something more than
an ad hoc proposition: it appears instead to assume the role of successor
to some venerable but now obsolete mechanism for achieving a balance
among competing points of view. The difficulty with this role for access
is that the quest for balance-and very nearly the whole idea of a free
and responsible press-is the product of this century and a late arrival
at that.
Certainly, little evidence suggests that the first amendment was
adopted in order to achieve this sort of balance. Dean Leonard Levy has
presented a persuasive argument that the framers did not arrive at an
expansive libertarian conception of the amendment until well after its
adoption, and then largely in order to meet the threat of prosecution for
seditious libel brought about by the election of the Federalists in 1798.52
One need not accept all of Dean Levy's reconstruction of this period to
agree with Zechariah Chafee's observation: "The truth is, I think, that
the framers [of the First Amendment] had no very clear idea what they
meant. . .

."I' One

may add that even if they did, there still is little

evidence that they sought balance in the press. On the contrary, to the
extent that the framers may be identified with philosophical movements
underlying then contemporary concepts of free speech and press, it
seems unlikely that they would have equated freedom with responsibility
in the manner now suggested. More precisely, it would not have occurred to them that a "responsible" member of the press is one who
takes a "balanced" position. Responsibility meant passionate, not dispassionate, commitment in the context of ideological debate." Indeed
they were themselves the most passionate of spokesmen for their own
points of view. For example, during his tenure in Washington's cabinet
"Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, supra note 5, at 1548.
"See L.W.

LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY

245-48 (1960).
"Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 898 (1949).
mSee MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 1-23. The discussion which appears in
that Report is based on the manuscript articles "Historical Development of the Media in American
Life," by J.W.Jensen and T. Peterson of the University of Illinois, and "The Role of the Press in
the Process of Change," by W. Rivers of Stanford University, each manuscript prepared under

AMERICAN HISTORY

private contract for the Media Task Force and under the editorial direction of the author of this
article. Copies of the manuscripts are on file in the office of the University of North Carolina Law
Review. See generally E. EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA (1962).
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Jefferson employed as "translator" a man named Freneau whose real
work for Jefferson was the publication of a partisan journal so vitriolic
in its attacks on Washington's policies that the President was driven into
near-apoplectic fits of rage.5 It is an amusing story, but an instructive
one as well: surely the framers of the first amendment could scarcely
have found it strange to find the press partisan, hostile or one-sided.
In fact, the press of that day was almost entirely partisan. The
economic and political circumstances in which publishers found themselves invited, if they did not require, an alliance between each publisher
and some patron in power. This was required not only because patronage meant lucrative printing contracts and similar privileges but also
because effective alternative sources of news and public information did
not exist. 6 If a publisher did not have the sympathetic attention of
someone in office, his own access to the day's events 57-never mind the
public's-was far from assured.
Not until the middle of the Nineteenth Century did the partisan
press begin to pass largely out of existence. But its passing did not mark
the emergence of a new period of altruism. Instead, the partisan press
simply fell victim to circumstances which would in time lead to the mass
media as we now know them. During this period, for example, the
proprietors of the "penny press" discovered that mass circulation revenues were a profitable alternative to patronage. It was also during this
period that the establishment of the wire services brought new and
cheaper means of gathering the news.55 The results of these developments were perhaps inevitable. Daily newspapers with large circulations
emerged and struggled for survival through the great press wars of the
late Nineteenth Century. The battles were fought for mass public patronage and the resulting advertising revenues which soon replaced circulation revenues as the economic anchor of the press. 0 When the
smoke had cleared, the partisan journals were gone, and their places
were taken by a new institution comprised of major business enterprises. " With all its faults the new press might have been defended as
having contributed indirectly to a somewhat greater sophistication and
'"MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 16.

11Id. at
57d.
"Id. at
591d.
11Id. at
11Id. at

15-18.
19.
18-23.
25.
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awareness among the masses.62 It certainly could not have been described as balanced.
The concepts of fairness and responsibility that we now routinely
demand of the media did not emerge until this century. The Radio Act
of 1927,63 and later the Communications Act of 1934,4 incorporated
standards which presupposed the need for service in the public interest.
In 1947, the privately financed Hutchins Commission published a report
based on an extensive examination into the structure and purpose of the
press; the title of the report, A Free and Responsible Press,65 reflected
the Commission's judgment that the press must accept a measure of
responsibility if in larger measure it was to remain free.6" Certainly,
these developments suggested a growing public sentiment that the press
ought to be made more responsible, but the fact remains that our
present-day concern for balance in the press is late-born.
There is, in short, little direct support for the access doctrine in
either the history of the framing of the first amendment or in the history
of the American press."7 To the extent that the access doctrine would
restore a lost "equilibrium" in the press, it is based on an imaginary
past. Imbalance is not a new problem nor one which has been brought
about by technological revolution. As a new and largely ad hoc solution
to an old problem, the access doctrine deserves a careful hearing. But
it also deserves to be seen as no more than it is.
C. Access to the new media.
To dismiss arguments for access which unwittingly or deliberately
rely on the market-place myth or some other form of historical revisionism is relatively easy. It is another matter, however, to respond to
arguments which rely on the changed character of the modern mass
media and in particular on what is seen as their increased impact upon
society. Essentially, the arguments for access in this context resolve
themselves into two propositions. First, the mass media have become
pervasive and influential to a degree unknown to any previous generation. Their evolution has placed them among the main instruments of
"Id. at 17.
63Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (pt. II).
"Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS (1947).
"Id. at 90-96.
"For additional perspective on the press in the post-colonial period, see generally Note, Media
and the First Amendment in a Free Society, supra note 5, at 874-82.
"COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
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contemporary socialization. As such they are simply too important for
their owners 'and managers to be permitted to be altogether free to
determine their content.6" Second, the emergence of the mass media has
brought new threats to the free exchange of thought in the form of
concentrated economic power which inhibits ideological debate and offers constantly increasing barriers to those who would establish new
media outlets.69
The development of the media is without precedent. Indeed, the
statistics which describe this growth are staggering. From a beginning
in 1690 which saw the first American newspaper die after a single issue,70
through a colonial and revolutionary period in which journals were
circulated periodically to some 40,000 homes,71 the press has evolved
"from medium to media": 2 1,749 daily newspapers 73 and 8,301 weeklies; 74 some 9,000 other periodicals, including more than 150 magainzes
of general circulation; 75 more than 280 million books published each
year;76 nearly 200 new motion pictures released annually for general
exhibition in more than 13,000 theaters; 77 6,782 commercial and 549
educational radio stations;7 8 701 commercial and 221 educational television stations. 79 The evolutionary process has not ended. Cable television
and "the wired city" are at hand as more than 2,839 existing cable
systems 0 can expect to be joined by some 4,392 more within the decade."' Only slightly further off is the day of the home videotape cassette
player, a television play-back-and-recording device which promises to
"See, e.g., Barrow, The Equal Opportunitiesand Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting:Pillars
in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 447, 545-49 (1968); Johnson & Westen, supra
note 5, at 582, 603-04; Note, Media and the FirstAmendment in a Free Society, supra note 5, at
993-1000.
"See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5, at
1646-47, 1666; Malone, supra note 5, at 203; Note, Resolving the FreeSpeech-FreePress Dichot.ony: Access to the Press Through Advertising, supra note 5, at 295-99.
"MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 6.
"Id. at 16.
"2d.at 25-32.
"1EDITOR AND PUBLISHER YEARBOOK (1972).
"AYER

DIRECTORY OF PUBLICATIONS (1973).

"MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 1.

"Id. at 165. The figure refers to press runs, not individual titles, but does suggest something
of the public's continuing appetite for books.
7id.
"BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 12 (1973).
791d.

"Cable Television Information Center, Cable Data (1972).
81Id. Of this number, franchises have been awarded for 1,663 systems which have not begun
operation, and applications for franchises were pending in another 2,729 communities.
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permit individuals to acquire a home library of television recordings in
much the same way as they now buy sound recordings in a record shop.82
No one denies, then, that the media have been transformed in this
century. Indeed the metamorphosis has been so remarkable that it
seems almost impolite to suggest that these obvious manifestations of
change do not necessarily demand new attitudes toward media regulation. Still, it is fair to ask for some evidence of the need for change which
goes beyond the obvious growth of the media. Insofar as the case for
an affirmative right of access is concerned, the evidence is less than
clear.
1. The new impact of the media. Throughout the arguments for
access run certain commonly held assumptions concerning the new impact of the mass media in American life. These assumptions reflect the
underlying premise that the new media are possessed of extraordinary
capacities for producing particular effects upon their audience. Not
infrequently, these supposed properties of the media are described in
terms which suggest a new kind of magic: the media, it is said, "mesmerize";83 we are their "captives", 4 caught up together in a new, and
somewhat frightening, "global village"." Even when the more hyperbolic assertions are discounted, a nearly overwhelming residue of conviction remains that the media have the power to contribute quite directly to the resolution of the great social issues-"to advance the progress of civilization or to thwart it.""8 In particular, it is commonly

assumed that the media are the principal means by which public opinion
is shaped. 7 Not surprisingly, then, they are also seen as the main instruments for effective public dissent. These assumptions take on added
importance in times of crisis. To the extent that the media deny access
to dissenting points of view, they appear to abdicate their proper role
and deny their own capacity to contribute peaceful solutions to prevailing unrest.88
uMeanwhile, inexpensive videotape systems already form the backbond of much programming originated for cable television. See N.Y. Times, June 13, 1972, at 14, cols. 1-3.
"Barron, Access to the Media-A New FirstAmendment Right, supra note 5, at 1645.
91d.
"5H.M. McLUHAN & Q. FIORE, WAR AND PEACE IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE (1968).
"COMMISSION ON THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 3 (1947).
"See, e.g., id.; H.M., McLuhan, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA (1964), cited in Barron, Access to
the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5, at 1645 n.1 1; Fisher, Program Control
and the Federal Communications Commission: A Limited Role, 14 VILL. L. REV. 602 (1969);
Johnson & Westen, supra note 5, at 582.
"See generally Clark & Hutchison, supra note 5, at 1-15; Mallamud, supra note 5, at 96-106,
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These assumptions are so widely held that it is easy to forget that
they are also largely unproven. The radical growth and pervasiveness of
the media make it tempting to suppose that they must be possessed of
equally radical potential for producing specific effects upon the society
which harbors them. As Professor Louis Jaffe has noted, influence is
too easily confused with ubiquity. 9
The growth of the media is not in doubt and neither, in the obvious
sense, is their pervasiveness. The Media Task Force of the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence found, for example, that "from any standpoint, the media clearly play an important, and
perhaps critical, role in daily American living":"
Some media are available to nearly everyone, and nearly everyone
makes some use of them. Most (95 percent) American homes include
at least one TV set: nearly all (99 percent) own at least one radio. In
a typical weekday, 82 percent of adults watch television; the average
time invested is more than two hours. Two-thirds of America's adults
listen to the radio, on the average more than an hour a day. More than
nine out of every ten adults read a magazine sometime during the
month and approximately three-fourths of the adult population read
one or more newspapers on a typical weekday. Although movie-going
is less universal, a third of the adult population sees at least one film
in a typical month.
. . . For most . . . children, as for most Americans generally,
television provides more than entertainment: it also provides Americans with the single most important and credible source of news about
the world around them.9
These statistics are reliable as indicators of media usage. We can
also accept an assertion that for the "typical" American television is a
more "credible" source of news than are the other mass media. But
statistics and general assertions do not answer far more difficult and
significant questions concerning specific media effects. Assuming that
a child watches television four hours on Sunday afternoon, what of it?
Note, The First Amendment and Regulation of Television News, supra note 5, at 765-67; Note,
24 VAND. L. REV. 1273 (1971).
B'See Jaffe, supra note 21, at 769. See also Robinson, supra note 21, at 151, 154-56.
"°MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 2.
91ld.
"The credibility of television news must be assessed against other media, rather than all other
sources. The larger suggestion in the passage is, I confess, an example of the hyperbole which tends
to find its way into otherwise careful assessments of the media. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 3 (1947).
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What happens to him? How are his perceptions of the world around him
shaped or influenced? If his father and his mother watch television but
also read a newspaper, how, exactly, are their ultimate opinions influenced? More particularly, how are their opinions influenced by the mass
media as compared with the influence exerted by their friends across the
street, by bad stomachs, hard times, ungrateful children, by army buddies, old school chums, employers, employees or fellow workers-or by
their wealthy bachelor uncle in upstate New York?
Few statements beyond the level of generalization can be made with
confidence about the role of the media in contemporary American society unless questions like these can be answered with some degree of
certainty. Yet the fact is that they cannot. Meaningful communications
research in this country has barely begun. The answers-assuming that
research can provide them-are yet to be found.
In a thoughtful summary of existing research into media effects,
sociologist William R. Catton, Jr., has identified three distinct bodies
of opinion which have enjoyed some currency since the late Nineteenth
Century. The first he has described as the "hypodermic" theory, an
early but persistent view in which the media were seen as "insidious
shapers of consent . . . [and] their audiences . . . as atomized and

defenseless targets of deliberate or inadvertent propaganda."
writes:

3

He

The early supposition that mass media can "inject" effects into a
passively recipient audience was based on a supposition about the
nature of modern societies. It was assumed that western civilization
had become a "mass" society, in which individuals were relatively

detached from each other and from a social fabric, and therefore
homogeneously susceptible to stimuli from impersonal media. It was
supposed that the urban way of life, in which primary group relations
had been largely displaced by secondary group relatons, made this so.
The traditional basis of solidarity had been undermined, it was assumed, the family had lost its place in the social order and the neighborhood as a social entity was disappearing. Segmentalization of
human relations was seen as characteristic of but not confined to cities.
3

MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 247. This section of the Task Force report

was prepared by W.R. Catton, Jr., of the University of Washington, in an article, "Mass Media
As Producers of Effects: An Overview of Research Trends." Professor Catton's paper is especially

useful as an antidote to the conventional law journal citation of individual communications theorists. For reasons which he explains, individual theories be assessed against the larger theoretical
framework within which they have been written.
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The heterogeneity of urban populations, the sheer numbers of people,
and increased mobility all tended to detach people from stable groups
and to foster increased reliance on formal mechanisms of norm enforcement. Kinship ties, it was assumed, lose their effectiveness in
urban environments, and territorial units such as the residential neighborhood cease to function as a basis for social solidarity. The city
becomes "a series of tenuous segmental relationships superimposed
upon a territorial base with a definite center but without a definite
periphery."'"
The difficulty with the hypodermic theory, Catton goes on to say, is that
this early view of urban society was not all so clearly borne out by the
American experience in the first half of the Twentieth Century:
Family and neighborhood ties were found to be still functioning
in varying degrees in all parts of even the largest cities. Astronomical
numbers of people did not alone turn a community into a mass society
where individuals were psychologically isolated from one another.
There was diminishing acceptance of the assumption that a kind of
social pathology called anomie, wherein human beings lose their capacity to relate to each other effectively, was the necessary result of
over-elaboration of the division of labor. Thus there was growing skepticism among social scientists about the notion that a functionally
heterogeneous population produces such a segementalized life that in
relation to mass media, the people are uniformly submissive95
Skepticism in the 1950's ripened into disparagement of the hypodermic theory.9" In its place a second theory gained acceptance. Perhaps
predictably, it rejected the concept of media effects altogether:
As research accumulated, it became necessary to introduce more
and more "intervening variables" into this simple stimulus-response
model. It became necessary to recognize significant variations in the
desires and inclinations of audience members, in the way they received
media stimuli, and in their socially-shaped opportunities to respond.
The upshot of all these complications was that it began to seem as if
the answer to the question "What effects do mass media produce?"
. " and it was only a short step from
had to be, "It all depends
that to a feeling that the media really don't produce effects at all. The
contingent nature of mass media impact made it seem that the effects
ought to be attributed to the intervening variables instead of (rather
"MAss MEDIA AND VIOLENCE, supra note 44, at 247-48.

111d. at 248.
"Id. at 249.
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than in conjunction with) the mass media stimuli.
Thinking was moved in this direction by research that established
the selective nature of perception. Individuals with different values, or
whose other personality characteristics differ, perceive the same stimuli differently. At first, this discovery resulted merely in a modification of the "hypodermic" concept of mass communication: media may
produce different effects with different kinds of people, but if people
can be put in categories, the effects of mass communications injections
into a particular category may still be predictable and powerful. Later
the emphasis on perceptual selectivity led to outright disparagement
of the notion that media have effects at all."
Another two decades have brought still a third theoretical orientation toward media effects. Less cohesive than its predecessors and more
tentative, the contemporary theory acknowledges that the media may
not produce effects unmediated "by a complex nexus of social and
psychological factors";98 at the same time, it recognizes the probability
that the media do possess some capacity to create effects, however
modified. 9 Two factors have contributed to the emergence of this contemporary theoretical "middle ground." One is that in the past twenty
years television appears to have achieved unprecedented capacity "to
simulate primary interaction:" ' Walter Cronkite, the theory goes, has
become another member of the family. The second is somewhat more
complex and involves a modest irony. It stems from a certain innate
"lag" in social science research: even as LaPiere was discovering in the
early 1950's that urban society had not yet developed according to the
initial hypotheses, the society itself may in fact have been in the very
process of developing along the lines originally suggested by Tonnies
and other classic theorists.0
Does all of this presage an imminent return to the hypodermic
theory of the media? It does not. Social scientists, twice burned by
premature attempts to formulate viable comprehensive theories of
media effects, are no longer sanguine about the complex problems which
this area of research poses. In contemporary theory, the media are
seen as neither clearly guilty nor clearly innocent as producers of
specific effects. They are instead, in Catton's phrase, "incompletely
"Id. at 248-49.
111d. at 251.
921d.
1G'Id.
11Id. at 254.
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exonerated":10 2
To sum up, research has shown that mass media do not easily and
inevitably produce intended effects. . . Serious investigation is needed
now to determine what long-range-unintended consequences will occur
from the way we have organized our lives around the mass media, and
especially around that simulator of primary groups, television." 3
Meanwhile, what lies at the core of nearly all specific decisions
implementing communications policy is not knowledge but conventional
wisdom. More precisely, what is being served is not the certainty or even
the reasonable assurance of some particular effect but rather a set of
perceptions, often obscured although equally often disguised as known
truth. The arguments for access also have been attended, in at least an
off-hand way, by the conventional suppositions about what the media
can or ought to do for us. Former Federal Communications Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, another leading access proponent, has been
among the least restrained: television, he has said, is "the American
people's principal source of information, opinion, aesthetic taste, moral
values, political participation, education, and national priorities." 104 If
statements like these do not invite outright rejection, they serve at
least to call attention to one of the difficulties with the case for access.
The access proponents are unable to demonstrate the existence of specific media impact for the reasons previously suggested. Existing research is simply inadequate to permit it.
I do not argue that that ought to end the inquiry into access. In
the first place, I am persuaded by the contemporary theoretical orientation toward the media that some of the more reasonable speculations
about media effects are probably correct. In particular, I am inclined
to agree with Professor Jaffe that, subject to a host of other factors, the
mass media probably do have a modest direct capacity to reinforce
existing attitudes and, in cases in which attitudes are unformed or only
tentatively held, to shape them."0 5 I shall argue later that even if these
speculations are true, they argue against, rather than for, an enforceable
right of access for very practical reasons. In any event, we are free to
formulate media policy without waiting for the social scientists to sup1id. at 253-58.
3

i at 258.
1d.
10'Johnson, supra note 5, at 15.
"0Jaffe, supra note 21, at 769-70.
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And yet, where the media are concerned, we have

traditionally displayed a certain reluctance to call for action by the
state, preferring instead to call upon the media themselves for an increased measure of self-regulation. Why is it, then, that the proposals

for an access doctrine have developed to the contrary? Why have the
access proponents called for an affirmative, enforceable right of access
rather than increased access through voluntary media compliance?
There are obviously a number of reasons, but among them two are
paramount. The first is that our restraint toward the media has not been
rewarded with the degree of responsiveness which seems desired. Left
to their own devices, the media-with occasional noteworthy exceptions-tend to continue in the very practices which have occasioned
criticism in the first place. Politically, this tendency alone might well
prove their undoing. The contemporary assessment of the media is that
they do produce effects, that they are among the main instruments of
contemporary socialization. That these hypotheses cannot be proven in
very specific terms is true; it is also largely irrelevant so long as this
assessment persists and so long as the media themselves remain blind
'"But see Note, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, supra note 5, at 993-1000,
Professor Canby has argued that "the mere fact that radio and television do not convert the
opposition does not make them of small political consequence, nor should it diminish the first
amendment value of access. Political campaigns concentrate on activating the favorably committed, and this is what media persuasion does best." Canby, supra note 5, at 740. He adds:
The importance of access to the media is almost certain to be undervalued, then, if
primary emphasis is laid upon the rarity of the media's effecting conversions of attitude.
The reinforcing effect of media persuasion has more than sufficient political impact to
give it substantial first amendment value. Nor is a high degree of informational content
of importance to the reinforcing effect of campaign advertising. For the purposes of
activating those already favorably committed, the less informational, one-sided presen.
tation is probably more effective than a fully balanced one which attempts to deal with
and refute points favoring the other side.
The persuasive impact of the broadcast media is also likely to be undervalued if
viewed only in terms of national political campaigns or issues like the Vietnam war,
where ideological lines have become sharply drawn. A media message may introduce
viewers have few predispositions, and there is reasons to believe that the persuasive effect
in such cases is accordingly higher. The same holds true for local political issues as to
which the voters' general political inclinations may be irrelevant. Yet these new or local
issues are frequently of undeniable public importance. One need not be guilty of oversimplification, then, to conclude that persuasion by means of the broadcast media is sufficiently effective and significant to justify the administrative and practical difficulties
which may result from extending it first amendment protection. (Footnotes omitted.)
This is an attractive argument. But the "administrative and practical difficulties" are formidable,
as Professor Canby himself acknowledges. Id. at 754-57. One can argue that the impact of the
media at its greatest cannot be employed effectively because of these very difficulties. See text
accompanying notes 331-32 infra.
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to it. The Hutchins Commission was undoubtedly correct twenty-five
years ago when it warned that continued media practices "which the
society condemns" would inevitably result in media regulation and

control. That day may well be at hand.
But there is a second, even more immediate reason why access

doctrine promises to develop with, rather than without, the assistance
of the state. As we have seen, the case for access is predicated in part
upon unproven but commonly held perceptions concerning the new impact of the media. It is also predicated upon the altogether real concen-

tration of media ownership in increasingly fewer hands. The pressures
for the developing access doctrine cannot be appreciated without an
understanding of this economic predicate.
2. The economic predicate. To begin with, the economic argument for the access doctrine rests on statistics which reveal, in broad

terms, two facts about media ownership and control. One is that in any
given medium there has been a tendency toward concentrated ownership

and a corresponding concentration of economic power."0 7 The other is
that there has been a correlative tendency toward cross-ownership of the

media."' Newspaper owners, for example, often control more than one
paper; 091 they have also been inclined to seek ownership of the broadcast
media as well.110

To the access proponents, the implications of these facts are obvious and inescapable. In the first place, they contend, the pressures to

which media proprietors are subject are primarily economic, not ideological."' The modern mass media have developed because their owners
1I7See Bennett, Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing with a Section Seven Lens, 66
Nw. U.L. REv. 159, 181-86 (1971); Flynn, Antitrust and the Newspapers, 22 VAND. L. REV. 103,
120 (1968); Johnson & Hoak, Media Concentration: Some Observations on the United States'
Experience, 56 IowA L. REV. 267, 269-70 (1970); Comment, "Cross-Media" Ownership and the
Antitrust Laws-A Critical Analysis and a Suggested Solution, 47 N.C.L. REV. 794, 802 (1969).
See generally Johnson, supra note 5, at 17-22.
108See Bennett, supra note 107, at 181-86; Johnson & Hoak, supra note 107, at 269; Comment,
"Cross-Media" Ownership and the Antitrust Laws-A CriticalAnalysis andaSuggested Solution,
supra note 107, at 794-805.
112See Bennett, supra note 107, at 181-86; Flynn, supra note 107, at 120; Comment, "CrossMedia" Ownership and the Antitrust Laws-A Critical Analysis and a Suggested Solution, supra
note 107, at 802.
0
" See Bennett, supra note 107, at 181-86; Johnson & Hoak, supra note 107, at 269-71;
Comment, "Cross-Media" Ownership and the Antitrust Laws-A CriticalAnalysis and a Suggested Solution, supra note 107, at 805.
"'E.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right. supra note 5, at 1641,
1646-47; Johnson, supra note 5, at 36-37; Comment, Freedom ofSpeech and the Individual'sRight
of Access to the Airwaves, supra note 5, at 424-29.
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realize that mass patronage is the source of substantial revenues. The
penny press depended on direct circulation revenues; the modern large
circulation newspaper, magazine or television station depends primarily
on advertising revenues. In either case, the key to success lies in an
appeal to the mass audience. In these circumstances, it is said, media
owners literally cannot afford to serve aberrant ideology if, in the process, they are likely to lose the audience upon which they depend.'
Meanwhile, according to the argument, individuals who are ideologically motivated may find themselves barred from the mass media
on two grounds. On the one hand, their views may be unacceptable to
the media proprietor because they may offend or otherwise alienate the
audience the proprietor dares not lose. On the other, the ideologues
cannot realistically hope to enter into competition with existing mass
media. The media are too well entrenched to permit viable competi113
tion.
Some of these statements may be readily conceded: size, a certain
concentration of ownership, and the decided economic advantages of the
existing media are obvious. But the economic arguments thus far do not
state a complete case for access. Access may well be difficult to obtain
for economic reasons. The question remains whether that matters. In
particular, one might ask whether it is not enough that dissent may find
expression in alternative media. The underground press, for example,
billboards, posters, pamphlets-even the hallowed, if somewhat embarrassing, tradition of the soapbox in the public square-presumably are
all available to the spokesmen for points of view excluded from the more
established media. The answer to these suggestsions, of course, lies in
the access proponents' ready assumptions concerning the unique capacities of the mass media to produce intended effects in their audiences.
"The test of a community's opportunities for free expression," it is
argued, "rests not so much in the abundance of alternative media but
rather in an abundance of opportunities to secure expression in media
with the largest impact."'1
It is this marriage of the economic predicate with the uneasy as"qThe point is made in the authorities cited in note I 11,supra, and is recognized generally in
the literature.
"'E.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 29, 32-33, 35-40; Note, Media and the First Amendment In
a Free Society, supra note 5, at 891-96; Comment, We Pick 'Em, You Watch 'Em: FirstAmendment Rights of Television Viewers, supra note 5, at 831-34. But see Daniel, supra note 21, at 789.
"'Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, supra note 5, at 1653. See
Canby, supra note 5, at 744-46.
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sumptions of particular media impact which provides the major source
of motivation for the affirmative proposals for access. The access proponents are not primarily interested in the availability of alternative
media. They are not even always interested in the potential of the antitrust laws; in the main, they do not argue that the mass media ought to
be broken up into smaller-presumably more accessible-components." 5 Instead, the proponents appear to assume that the mass
media are in effect natural monopolies. The media resemble natural
monopolies not because they have grown large nor because ownership is concentrated in a few hands, but because they alone are effective
instruments of communications in a mass urban society. In this sense,
the media resemble a rather limited kind of natural monopoly: like the
fountain of youth or the goose that laid golden eggs, these enterprises
are thought to possess special properties which are not available elsewhere.
Yet unregulated monopolies are conventionally to be feared. It
may still be true, as the Supreme Court once suggested in a rather
distant context, that there is no "national policy" in favor of competition,"' but the contemporary judgment is widely held that monopoly
power is evil unless regulated. That judgment is reinforced when it is
made to appear that the cost of uncontrolled monopoly is the suppression of effective public debate. The solution, then, is thought to lie in
some form of regulation which will at once allow the supposed benefits
of the mass media to continue unimpaired while assuring that those
benefits inure to the public interest. Accordingly, the monopoly power
of the media is not merely occasion for alarm; it is the very excuse for
affirmative action which otherwise might itself be feared.
The point is illustrated more specifically in the cases in which
access to private newspapers was sought prior to Tornillo.117 In these
earlier cases, the plaintiffs argued that a newspaper which enjoys a
monopoly position does so in an area of "vital public concern ' 118 and is
"'See Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, supra note 5,
at 490, 498; Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, supra note 5, at 1653;
cf. Blake, supra note 21, at 91. There is still a substantial body of opinion which argues for a more
rigorous application of the antitrust laws to the media, either independently or as an accompaniment to a right of access. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 107; Johnson & Hoak, supra note 107, at
273-74; Note, Media and the FirstAmendment in a Free Society, supra note 5, at 902-04.
6
" FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1953).
" TNo. 43,009 (Fla. Sup. Ct., filed July 18, 1973), rehearingdenied, Oct. 10, 1973.
"'The equation between state action and monopoly power in an area of vital concern seems
to have been suggested first in Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of
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therefore engaged in "state action" giving rise to a right of access, in
much the same way that "private" shopping centers or "company
towns" can be seen as serving essentially public functions which may in
turn open them to the public. "9 The basic analogy was first suggested
by Professor Barron in his initial article proposing a right of access to
the press. 2 1 While it has not yet been accepted, its appeal is undeniable.
In a single equation, it posits not only the need for access but also the
necessary jurisdictional predicate for action by the courts.
The courts which have rejected the "monopoly-state action" claims
to access have done so on grounds which reveal at least an intuitive
grasp of the real tensions in the claims. ChicagoJoint Board v. Chicago
Tribune Co.' 21 was the first case to test the theory. The case resulted
essentially from a dispute between a local of the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers Union and Chicago's largest department store, Marshall Field
and Company. Field sold imported clothing which it advertised in Chicago's four major daily newspapers. The union, which was attempting
to secure restrictive quotas on the importation of foreign clothing,
sought to place a full page advertisement outlining its position in the
papers. When four of the papers refused to carry the advertisement as
submitted, the union sought injunctive relief. The main thrust of the
union's attack consisted of an effort to establish that the papers were
"quasi-public entities", either because they enjoyed a "special relationship" with the State of Illinois or because they enjoyed a monopoly
position.1 2 In support of its first ground, the union pointed to an Illinois
statute which exempted newspaper employees from jury duty, to other
statutes providing for the publication of legal notices, to statutes which
excluded newspaper publishers' suppliers (furnishing commodities such
as ink and newsprint) from certain state taxes, to a Chicago ordinance
purporting to restrict the use of newsstands on city streets to the sale of
Chicago newspapers, and to the custom of providing press rooms in
public buildings.123 It was, in all, not an unimpressive list, and in anColleges, 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969). The case deals with educational resources, rather than
the communications media, and did not actually find state action. Thus its only contribution has
been the equation itself.
"'See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968): Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
"'Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 5, at 1669.

121435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971). The author of this article
was among counsel for the defendant newspapers in the case.
"2id.at 473-74.
1"Id. at 473.
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other context it conceivably might have been enough to establish the
requisite showing of state action. As to the press, however, the court of
appeals responded, as had the district court, with a firm finding against
state action:
Rather than regarded as an extension of the state exercising delegated
powers of a governmental nature, the press has long and consistently

been recognized as an independent check on governmental
power. .

. .[T]he

function of the press.

. . has

never been conceived

as anything but a private enterprise, free and independent of government control and supervision. Rather than state power and participation pervading the operation of the press, the 12mass media and the
government have had a history of disassociation.
In its response, the court clearly was influenced by its perception of the
press as an institution engaged in a function essentially divorced from
the state. Thus circumstances which might have contributed to a finding
of state action in a more neutral setting were not enough to overcome
what amounted in essence to a presumption against state involvement
in the functions of the press. Marsh v. Alabama'2 and Food Employees
2 -in which a company town
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza"'
and a private shopping center had been held by the Supreme Court to
have assumed traditional municipal functions-were distinguished by
the court in ChicagoJoint Board not only because the newspaper publishers had not consented to unrestricted public access but also because
newspaper publication itself is not, in traditional contemplation, a public function. Terry v. Adams,"' in which the Supreme Court had found
the Texas Jaybird Party to be an integral part of the state's primary
process and therefore in violation of the fifteenth amendment in its
policies of racial exclusion, was rejected as precedent in ChicagoJoint
Board because the court found no indication of "intermeshing of action
or non-action by public officials with the action of the defendants ...
pursuant to a design or purpose to frustrate any First or Fourteenth
Amendment right of the Union."'2 Burton v. Wilmington Parking
1241d. at 474 (quoting the District Court opinion, Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
307 F. Supp. 422, 427 (N.D. Il.1969)).
1-326 U.S. 501 (1946).
1-391 U.S. 308 (1968).

"'Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470, 474-75 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
'-345 U.S. 461 (1953).
'2435 F.2d at 475.
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Authority3 ° was similarly distinguished: in Burton, a private restaurant
and the state agency from which the restaurant's facilities were leased
had established a relationship of "interdependence" which, on the facts,
had persuaded the Supreme Court that a joint venture existed;' 3' in
Chicago Joint Board, however, the court of appeals found no comparable relationship.3 2 In each of these cases, the court relied in part on
specific factual distinctions as a basis for rejection; yet it seems clear
that in a larger sense the court was influenced by a rather firm presumption against a finding of state action. The court was no less firm in its
rejection of the union's second point-the monopoly argument-but the
grounds for rejection were less direct than one might have wanted. In
point of fact, Chicago-with four major daily papers and a number of
smaller dailies in addition-is hardly the town in which to claim monopolization of the print media. And it was on this ground-that is, no
monopoly in fact-rather than a more
sweeping analysis of the point,
33
that the Court rejected the claim.
Other courts after Chicago Joint Board have also heard and rejected state action arguments predicated on the exercise of monopoly
control. In Cook v. Advertiser Co. 34 the plaintiffs brought a class
action on behalf of themselves and other Negroes against the publisher
of the only daily and Sunday newspapers in Montgomery, Alabama.
The suit alleged that the newspapers discriminated against Negroes in
that white engagement and wedding announcements were published on
the papers' regular society pages while similar announcements involving
Negroes were published on a separate "Negro news page." The plaintiffs argued that due process and equal protection were denied when
discrimination was practiced by an entity which exercises "monopoly
control in an area of vital public concern." Although the court stated
that it found the argument "quite appealing," it declined without elaboration to accept it.31 Instead, citing Chicago Joint Board, the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.' 3' In an opinion only slightly
more instructive, the Ninth Circuit held that a newspaper could not be
required to accept a movie advertisement exactly as submitted. In
1-365 U.S. 715 (1961).
MId. at 724-2.
"'435 F.2d at 476.

"'Id. at 477. But see D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 33 (Supp,
1971).
'11323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971),-affd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972).
"'323 F. Supp. at 1214.
"'Id.at 1214 n.4.
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Associates & Aldrich Co., Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 37 the plaintiff
sought an order directing the Los Angeles Times to publish advertisements for "The Killing of Sister George" without blue-pencilling the
copy to suit the Times' editorial policy. The plaintiff pointed to the
Times' "semi-monopoly and quasi-public position" in support of arguments for a finding of state action. 3 " The court, citing Chicago Joint
Board, rejected the argument in an opinion which did not squarely
discuss the relationship between monopoly power and state action." 9
Instead, the court was apparently influenced by the same presumption
against a finding of state action in the publication of a privately owned
newspapers which had first appeared in Chicago Joint Board. Thus, in
an echo of the earlier case, the court observed merely that "the press
and government have had a history of disassociation."' 40
A more expansive discussion of the monopoly issue appears in
Resident Participationof Denver, Inc. v. Love. 4 ' The plaintiffs, a group
of Denver citizens seeking to block the construction of a meat processing plant, had submitted advertisements to two Denver newspapers
which had refused to print them. The papers later moved to dismiss
portions of a complaint alleging state action in the refusal to publish.
A three-judge panel of the federal district court granted the motion in
an opinion which squarely addressed the issue:
Plaintiffs argue that newspapers ought to have a duty to provide reasonable space for citizens to express their views because in Denver, as
elsewhere, newspapers exercise "monopoly control in an area of vital
public concern." This does not mean, we take it, that defendants are
monopolies within the meaning of the antitrust laws, since no violation
of those laws is alleged, but rather than the soapbox has yielded to
radio and the political pamphlet to the newspaper. . . .However, the
fact that defendants control a method of reaching a large audience and
that this is a matter of importance to us all does not mean defendants'
conduct should be considered government conduct ....142
The court distinguished the same group of earlier state action cases
which had been rejected in Chicago Joint Board, and added a passage
which recalled the Seventh Circuit's presumption against government
"37440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1970).
'ld. at 134.
"''Id.
at 134-35.
"'Id.at 136.
1"'322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).
'2Id.at 1104.
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involvement in the press:
Of course, state action, like government itself, is not a fixed notion,
and we do not mean to suggest that enquiry comes to an end merely
because the cases which plaintiffs cite do not, in our view, support their
theory. However, the above-mentioned cases [Logan Valley Plaza;
Marsh v. Alabama; and Terry v. Adams] do indicate that, where
private conduct is concerned, there must be some justification for
concluding that the private party serves as an alter ego for government,
either because officialdom has in some important way become involved
with the private party or because the latter performs a function of a
governmental nature. Whatever may be the reach of these imprecise
ideas, we find them peculiarly inappropriate for describing the relationship between defendant newspapers and the State of Colorado and
City of Denver. Plaintiffs have made no allegation which would suggest a marriage among these parties, and the historic function of newspapers, like the pamphlets of a prior day, has been to oppose government, to be its critic not its accomplice."'
While these cases obviously suggest that courts may be unwilling
to accept Professor Barron's "monopoly-state action" theory without
something more, that additional element may unwittingly have been
supplied by the newspaper publishers themselves in their recent successful efforts to gain exemptions from the antitrust laws under the so-called
"Failing Newspaper Act." '44 The Act permits competing newspapers in
"11d. at 1105.

"'Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1970). The Act provides:
In the public interest of maintaining a newspaper press editorially and reportorially
independent and competitive in all parts of the United States, it is hereby declared to
be the public policy of the United States to preserve the publication of newspapers in
any city, community, or metropolitan area where ajoint operation arrangement has been
heretofore entered into because of economic distress or is hereafter effected in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. § 1802. Definitions. As used in this chapter(1) The term "antitrust law" means the Federal Trade Commission Act and each
statute defined by section 44 of this title as "Antitrust Acts" and all amendments to such
Act and such statutes and any other Acts in pari materia.
(2) The term "joint newspaper operating arrangement" means any contract,
agreement, joint venture (whether or not incorporated), or other arrangement entered
into by two or more newspapers owners for the publication of two or more newspaper
publications, pursuant to which joint or common production facilities are established or
operated and joint or unified action is taken or agreed to be taken with respect to any
one or more of the following: printing; time, method, and field of publication; allocation
of production facilities; distribution; advertising solicitation; circulation solicitation;
business department; establishment of advertising rates; establishment of circulation
rates and revenue distribution: Provided, That there is no merger, combination, or
amalgamation of editorial or reportorial staffs, and that editorial policies be indepen-
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distressed circumstances to combine their business functionsadvertising, production and circulation in particular-in order to
dently determined.
(3) The term "newspaper owner" means any person who owns or controls directly,
or indirectly through separate or subsidiary corporations, one or more newspaper publications.
(4) The term "newspaper publication" means a publication produced on newsprint paper which is published in one or more issues weekly (including as one publication
any daily newspaper and any Sunday newspaper published by the same owner inthe same
city, community, or metropolitan area), and in which a substantial portion of the content
is devoted to the dissemination of news and editorial opinion.
(5) The term "failing newspaper" means a newspaper publication which, regardless of its ownership or affiliations, is in probable danger of financial failure.
(6) The term "person" means any individual, and any partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity existing under or authorized by the law of the United
States, any State or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any foreign country.
§ 1803. Antitrust exemption.
(a) It shall not be unlawful under any antitrust law for any person to perform,
enforce, renew, or amend any joint newspaper operating arrangement entered into prior
to July 24n 1970, if at the time at which such arrangement was first entered into,
regardless of ownership or affiliations, not more than one of the newspaper publications
involved in the performance of such arrangement was likely to remain or become a
financially sound publication: Provided, That the terms of a renewal or amendment to
a joint operating arrangement must be filed with the Department of Justice and that the
amendment does not add a newspaper publication or newspaper publications to such
arrangement.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to enter into, perform, or enforce a joint
operating arrangement, not already in effect, except with the prior written consent of
the Attorney General of the United States. Prior to granting such approval, the Attorney
General shall determine that not more than one of the newspaper publications involved
in the arrangement is a publication other than a failing newspaper, and that approval
of such arrangement would effecute the policy and purpose of this chapter.
(c) Nothing contained in the chapter shall be construed to exempt from any
antitrust law any predatory pricing, any predatory practice, or any other conduct in the
otherwise lawful operations of a joint newspaper operating arrangement which would
be unlawful under any antitrust law if engaged in by a single entity. Except as provided
in this chapter, no joint newspaper operating arrangement or any party thereto shall be
exempt from any antitrust law.
§ 1804. Reinstatement of joint operating arrangements previously adjudged unlawful under antitrust laws.
(a) Notwithstanding any final judgment rendered in any action brought by the
United States under which a joint operating arrangement has been held to be unlawful
under any antitrust law, any party to such final judgment may reinstitute said joint
newspaper operating arrangement to the extent permissible under section 1803(a) of this
title.
(b) The provisions of section 1803 of this title shall apply to the determination of
any civil or criminal action pending in any district court of the United States on July
24, 1970, in which it is alleged that any such joint operating agreement is unlawful under
any antitrust law.
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permit them to continue independent editorial functions. As others are
beginning to observe,"' the Act itself suggests something of the government involvement in newspaper operations which the courts have thus
far refused to find. To be sure, this additional element may not be
enough to tip the balance. The essential purpose of the Act is to encourage continued competition among editorial voices in circumstances
which might otherwise result in the entire failure of effective competition, 46 and the actual degree of government involvement under the Act
is rather slight. There is, in particular, no provision for overseeing
the editorial policies of the "failing newspapers" and only modest requirements for complying with the act in other respects. Certainly the
act provides no scheme approaching the regulation of broadcasting
under the Communications Act. This may be of some importance, since
at present the Supreme Court lacks a clear majority for the holding that
broadcast licensees are engaged in state action when they deny access
in the exercise of editorial discretion, and has a substantial minority for
the proposition that they are not.14
Moreover, the concept of state action itself appears to have experienced at least a slight contraction as a result of two recent cases. In
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,4 5 the Court has held that a private club

which discriminated against Negroes did not engage in state action even
though it held a liquor license under a state regulation which required
the club to observe its own by-laws and thus, incidentally, their discriminatory provisions. The remedy, a majority held, was injunctive relief
against enforcement of the regulation, not against the discriminatory
practices themselves. The case is not directly relevant, but it does tend
to offset some of the more expansive language in earlier state action
cases. It is perhaps most useful for its suggestion that "where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have 'significantly
involved itself with invidious discriminations'

. . .

in order for the dis-

criminatory action to fall within the ambit of the Constitutional prohibi1"See, e.g., Note, Media and the FirstAmendment in a Free Society, supra note 5, at 906.
"'See H.R. REP. No. 91-1193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1970).
" t See text accompanying notes 197, 213, infra. It should be noted that one of the reasons that

five Justices in CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973), agree that access to the
broadcast media is not required is because Congress and the FCC have already developed adequate
regulatory patterns, regardless of whether licensees are affected by governmental action. See text
accompanying notes 194-96 infra. It is arguable that the very absence of established regulatory
patterns might require access to the print media if state action could otherwise be established.
148407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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tion."'' 9 There is at least some support in this language for the proposition that the state must involve itself in some significant way with
newspaper editorial policies before state action can be found. A second
case, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,5 ' is somewhat more closely related to the
state action arguments made in the newspaper cases. Those arguments
have placed particular reliaace on both Marsh"' and Logan Valley
5' In Lloyd, a majority of the Court has restricted the reading to
Plaza.1
be given to Logan Valley Plaza and may actually have limited Marsh
to its own facts. Like Logan Valley Plaza, the Lloyd case involved a
private shopping center which had been made the forum of first amendment expression. In Logan Valley Plaza a labor union had picketed one
of the shopping center stores; in Lloyd, however, antiwar protestors had
distributed handbills unrelated to the operation of the shopping center
itself. Although the Court had approved the picketing in Logan Valley
Plaza,"' it found that the distribution of handbills violated legitimate
private property interests where the speech "had no relation to any
purpose for which the center was built and being used"' 5 4 and where
"adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.' 1 5 Obviously,
this language has two edges: access proponents will argue that newspapers are devoted to the purpose of communication and, with the other
media, are the only effective means of communication. Taken alone, the
language might support the argument, although one could debate at
least its second half. In the context of the case, however, the language
has a rather different meaning. The Court obviously intended to limit
the notion that private property arguably serving a public function is
thereby implicated in state action. Thus Marsh is explained as having
involved "an economic anomaly of the past, 'the company town.' ",'51
And Logan Valley Plaza is distinguished on its facts. 57 In short, the
"'Id. at 173.
1-407 U.S. 551 (1972).
15326 U.S. 501 (1946).
152391 U.S. 308 (1968).

'All we decide here is that because the shopping center serves as the community
business block 'and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those
passing through' . . . the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its
trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their
First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally
consonant with the use to which the property is actually put.
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1968).
"'407 U.S. at 564.
11Id. at 567.
111id. at 561.
"71d. at 563.
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Court's opinion can hardly be argued to expand the frontiers of state
action. Indeed, the Court places particular emphasis on "the scope of
the invitation extended to the public" by the private enterprise.' It
notes, for example, that in the case of the shopping center in question
"there is no open-ended invitation to the public to use the Center for
any and all purposes, however incompatible with the interests ...
[being served]."' 59 By analogy, one can also argue that private newspapers extend no "open-ended invitation" to publish material which is
"incompatible" with the editorial interests that they wish to serve.'
For the time being, then, the principal response to the state action
arguments for access to the print media will probably continue to be that
given by the courts in Chicago Joint Board and Love: the traditional
"disassociation" between newspapers and government and the resulting
presumption against state involvement. That response is weakened as
tradition is displaced by new legislation under which the government
appears to provide special support for the press. Yet no general legislation to date appears clearly to suggest the "significant involvement" of
the state which is required in order to find state action.' 6'
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that the future of the
access doctrine depends on the resolution of the state action question.
The question is intriguing, as much for its very ingenuity as for the
possibility it offers of establishing a right of access without initial recourse to Congress, the legislatures or administrative agencies. Yet
these cases are important chiefly as illustrations of the substantial motivation for access which is provided by the economic predicate. So long
as the concentration of economic power in the established media is
identified with the premise of the new impact of the media, the pressures
for access will continue. And as Democratic National Committee and
Tornillo suggest there may still be room for the development of a comprehensive right of access along lines not present in the earlier cases.
U"Id. at 564.
1111d. at 565.
"'Cases prior to Chicago Joint Bd. have typically found that newspapers do not hold themselves out as willing to accept unwanted material. E.g., Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co.,
177 So. 2d 704 (Fla. App. 1965) (1968). See Note, Newspaper Regulation and The Public Interest:
The Unmasking of a Myth, supra note 21, at 603-05.

"'Efforts to gain legislation in support of a "newsman's privilege" against compulsory disclosure of sources, if successful, would undoubtedly raise again the question of state action. At least
some members of the press are beginning to recognize the dangers in this kind of legislation. See
Laphaw, The Temptation of a Sacred Cow. HARPER'S, Aug. 1973, at 52, 54.
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V. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE AND TORNILLO V.

THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING

A.

Co.:

ACCESS AT THE CROSSROADS

Democratic National Committee.

The background of the decision in Democratic National Committee has been rather extensivwly discussed in earlier articles and needs
only a brief rehearsal here.1 12 The case is really two cases involving
similar claims by groups which had sought access to the broadcast
media in 1970. The Democratic National Committee had attempted to
buy advertising time in order to air the political viewpoints of the Democratic Party and, one supposes not wholly incidentally, to invite contributions to the party's coffers. A second organization, the Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, had sought to broadcast paid advertisements in opposition to the Vietnam War. Rebuffed by the broadcasters,
both organizations had sought an FCC ruling in their favor, again without success.163 A consolidated appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia proved more fruitful. In a majority opinion, Judge
Wright held that a broadcaster who accepts commercial announcements
may not wholly ban "paid public issue announcements." ' 4 Instead,
Judge Wright posited an "abridgeable" first amendment right to access
under "reasonable procedures and regulations" to be established by the
FCC on remand.' Thus, neither the Democratic National Committee
nor the Business Executives were themselves specifically assured of access; they were assured only that the broadcasters could no longer simply refuse to sell them tinie.
For Judge Wright, the central issue was whether the first amendment itself affirmatively requires some form of direct .access to the
commercial broadcast media. 6 ' In his opinion, the answer was to be
found in two "functional considerations." First, he suggested, the
broadcasting industry has been founded upon the basis of government
regulatory patterns which have established a relationship of "interde"'See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 21, at 781-88; 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 870 (1971); 6 U. RICH. L.
REV. 448 (1972); 24 VAND. L. REV. 1273 (1971).
'"See Democratic Nat'l Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970); Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970).
"'Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 646 (1971).
11S1d. at 646, 655.
111"[WVe conclude that the constitutional question must be faced and is, indeed, the essence of
these cases. Whether our decision is styled as a "First Amendment decision' or as a decision
interpreting the fairness and public interest requirements 'in light of the First Amendment' matters
little." Id. at 649.
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pendence" and "joint participation;" thus the broadcast media have
become involved with government along lines whidh strongly suggest the
presence of state action.' 7 State action was particularly indicated, he
thought, by the FCC's role in upholding the broadcasters' policies concerning the advertisements.' 68 Secondly, he added, the broadcast media
are not only "specifically dedicated to communication," but have become "our foremost forum for public speech and our most important
educator of an informed people."1 9 Judge Wright therefore concluded
that "the public's First Amendment interests constrain broadcasters not
only to provide the full spectrum of viewpoints, but also to present them
in an uninhibited, wide-open fashion and to provide opportunity for
individual self-expression." 70 These obligations, he went on to say, are
met only partly by the requirements of the fairness doctrine. Some
procedures must also allow direct public access to the commercial
broadcast media: controversial speech may not be discriminated against
by those who have opened their facilities to commercial or noncontroversial speech .'7 Accordingly he held "that a flat ban on paid
public issue announcements is in violation of the First Amendment, at
least when other sorts of paid announcements are accepted.' 72
It is this holding which a majority of the Supreme Court has rejected. In an opinion by the Chief Justice, with several concurrences, the
majority concludes that although broadcasting is appropriately the subject of regulation in the public interest, the regulatory scheme envisioned
by Congress and the FCC does not embrace the principle of a direct
right of access-and under the first amendment need not do so.
Beginning with what has been the standard, if increasingly less
persuasive, justification for broadcast regulation, Chief Justice Burger
acknowledges the "inherent physical limitation" imposed by the electro'Id. at 651.
'MId. at 652.
"Id. at 653.
1id. at 655.
1id. at 658-60.
By opening up a forum for some paid presentations, independently edited and controlled
by members of the public, the broadcasters have waived any argument that advertising
is inherently disruptive of the proper function of their stations. The exclusion of only
one sort of advertising-which we have shown to have great First Amendment value-is
then highly suspect, a primafacieconstitutional violation. To justify the exclusion, there
must be a substantial factor distinguishing the disruptive effect of editorial advertising
from that of commercial advertising.
Id. at 660. Judge Wright found no such factor evident in the case.
"'Id. at 646.
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magnetic spectrum. Broadcasting must be regulated, in this view,
because it is a scarce medium: "all who possess the financial resources
and the desire to communicate by television or radio cannot be satisfactorily accommodated."' 174 And having accepted the proposition that
broadcasting must be regulated in the public interest, he moves easily
to an acceptance of the co-ollary which holds that competing first
against the purposes
amendment claims must be carefully weighed
75
served by the established regulatory structure.1
In a review of the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927 and
the Communications Act of 1934, the Chief Justice concludes that Congress considered-and rather specifically rejected-proposals which
would have required the broadcast media to serve as common carriers
for all points of view concerning public issues. 7" Instead, he writes, "it
seems clear that Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to
develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public
obligations. Only when the interests of the public are found to outweigh
the private journalistic interests of the broadcasters will government
power be asserted within the framework of the Act."' 77 The Chief Justice's analysis of the legislative history of the two acts is persuasively
drawn, although it may well suggest more than he intends. In an article
written nearly a decade ago, Professor John Sullivan employed a similar
analysis to suggest that the fairness doctrine itself contravened the intentions of those who framed the acts. 178 For the Chief Justice and those
who join him, however, it is the fairness doctrine which has provided
an essential balance in the legislative scheme:
Of particular importance in light of Congress' flat refusal to impose a
"common carrier" right of access for all persons wishing to speak out
on public issues, is the Commission's "Fairness Doctrine," which
evolved gradually over the years spanning federal regulation of the
broadcast media. Formulated under the Commission's power to issue
regulations consistent with the "public interest," the doctrine imposes
two affirmative responsibilities on the broadcaster: coverage of issues
of public importance must be adequate and must fairly reflect differing
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (1973).
'"CBS
4
17 1d.

17593S. Ct. at 2086, 2090.

"'Id. at 2088-90.
'"Id. at 2090.
"$See Sullivan, supra note 21, in which the author notes the ambivalent nature of the fairness

doctrine in its early stages, and traces its evolution into a major legal concept in broadcast
regulation. See also Blake, supra note 21, at 76-82.
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viewpoints. ....In fulfilling its Fairness Doctrine obligations, the
broadcaster must provide free time for the presenitation of opposing
views if a paid sponsor is unavailable

. . .

and it must initiate pro-

gramming on public issues if no one else seeks to do so.'
In short, the fairness doctrine provides both balance and a bridge between opposing considerations. Broadcasting is constrained by limitations which make it "physically impossible to provide time for all viewpoints;" yet the public interest requires robust discussion of issues so
that the public is fully and fairly informed. Under the fairness doctrine,
it is the broadcaster who, in the exercise of editorial judgment, is "responsible for providing the listening and viewing public with access to a
balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance."''
This view of the case is scarcely new. In fact, it is quite consistent
with the Court's opinion in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC8' in
which the fairness doctrine was upheld against attacks by broadcasters.
In Red Lion, Justice White had said:
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional
right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio
frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in
the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring
a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself
as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would
otherwise, by necessity, be banned from the air-waves.'
To be sure, this language had not clearly established that the broadcaster's role as "proxy or fiduciary" would be sufficient to satisfy individual claims to access. In particular, the access proponents had found
encouraging a subsequent passage in the opinion which had seemed to
suggest that at least a limited right of access might be forthcoming:"
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should
be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain
their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have
11193 S. Ct. at 2090 (footnotes omitted).

"'Id.at 2091 (footnotes omitted).

1"395 U.S. 367 (1969).
1id. at 389.
"3See, e.g., Comment, From the FCC's Fairness Doctrine to Red Lion's FiduciaryPrinciple,
supra note 5, at 95; Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting,supra note 5, at 866-72;
15 S.D.L. REv. 172 (1970).
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the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the
First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.

.

.

.It is the purpose

of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself
or a private licensee. . .. "S]peech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government . .

. ."

It is

the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
aesthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
That right may not constitutonally be abridged either by Congress or
by the FCC." 4
Yet whatever promise this and similar language in Red Lion may have
held, the majority in Democratic National Committee suggests rather
clearly that balanced coverage under a system of trusteeship is an adequate alternative to a right of access in individual members of the
public.'85
The concept of the broadcaster as a kind of editorial trustee is
indeed central to the case. For a majority of the Court assumes that
under either the "public interest" standard of the Communications Act
or the standard imposed by the first amendment there is but one answer
to the question whether an affirmative individual right of access to the
broadcast media is required. Under either standard, a right of access not
only is not required, but might actually jeopardize the "delicate balance" which has been developed through a system based on editorial
trusteeship. A right to have access through paid advertisements might
result in domination of the media by the affluent;' even if fairness
doctrine principles were invoked to permit response by thb'se who could
not initially afford to pay, the thrust of public discussion would still be
determined by those who could. 8 7 There is reason to be concerned, the
Chief Justice adds, when broadcasting's "captive audience" may be
subjected to the views of those who, unlike licensees, are held to no
standards of accountability.188 Of more importance than these objections, however, is the likelihood that "[u]nder such a regime the congressional objective of balanced coverage of public issues would be seriously
111395 U.S. at 390.
"'See text accompanying notes 225-27 infra.
"'93 S. Ct. at 2097-98.

'"Id.at 2096-97.
"'Id. at 2097.
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threatened."' 89
One cannot read the concluding passages of the opinion without
gaining some insight into the essential ambivalance inherent in the concept of editorial trusteeship. On the one hand, there are classic statements of the most traditional view of laissez-fairejournalism under the
first amendment:
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for: and editing is
selection and choice of material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast-can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is not
reason to deny the discretion Congress provided. Calculated risks of
abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values. The presence of
these risks is nothing new; the authors of the Bill of Rights accepted
the reality that these risks were evils for which there was no acceptable
remedy other than a spirit of moderation and a sense of responsibility-and civility-on the part of those who exercise the guaranteed
freedoms of expression.'
There is corresponding concern that an affirmative right of access may
lead to an enlargement of government control over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues.' 9' Yet it is abundantly clear that the
majority is unprepared either wholly to accept the "risks of abuse"
posed by unlimited editorial discretion or to abandon the "government
control" already imposed upon broadcast content. On the contrary, the
majority readily accepts what it interprets as the Congressional judgment that broadcast content be shaped by standards of regulated accountability:
It was reasonable for Congress to conclude that the public interest in
being informed requires periodic accountabilityon the part of those
who are entrusted with the use of broadcast frequencies, scarce as they
are. In the delicate balancing historically followed in the regulation of
broadcasting Congress and the Commission could appropriately conclude that the allocation of journalistic priorities should be concentrated in the licensee rather than diffused among many. This policy
gives the public some assurance that the broadcaster will be answerable
if he fails to meet their legitimate needs. No such accountability attaches to the private individual whose only qualifications for using the
broadcast facility may be abundant funds and a point of view. To agree
that debate on public issues should be "robust, and wide-open" does
189d
1901d.
1I1d.
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not mean that we should exchange "public trustee" broadcasting, with
all its 2limitatons, for a system of self-appointed editorial commenta9
tors.
There is, again, nothing really new in this ambivalence. Broadcasting regulation has always posed the paradoxes reflected in the majority
opinion. 9 3 The disposition by the majority is in no important sense a
retreat from the well-established principles under which broadcast regulation has developed. Broadcasting must be regulated because it is
scarce-and the task is essentially one for Congress and the FCC together with the licensees. The creation of an affirmative right of access
also will depend upon their initiative. Meanwhile, the first amendment
does not require it under the established regulatory scheme.
While this summary is essentially accurate, the case is more subtle
and requires some further explanation. Indeed, the case is of interest
more for what it does not do than for what it does. In the first place, it
affords little insight into the difficult question of the degree to which the
American mass media have become affected by "governmental action."
The Court, including the members of the majority, are quite unable to
agree on that question even in the relatively limited context of the
broadcoast media in which one might have supposed the answer reasonably clear. Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell find it unnecessary to
decide the question since, in their view, a broadcaster's refusal to accept
paid editorial advertising does not necessarily contravene the first
amendment even if government action is involved.194 For them in particular, the existence of the fairness doctrine and the balanced coverage
that it requires is enough. 95 They are joined in this view by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist and the Chief Justice who assume its correctness even though
they are prepared to find no government action in the case. 1 6
Justice Stewart joins Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice in
concluding that government action is not implicated either in the broadcasters' refusal to accept the controversial advertisements or in the
FCC's acquiescence in that position. 97 In their view, Congress has es"'Id.at 2097-98.
931d.
"'See Kalven, supra note 21, at 24-26; Robinson, supra note 21, at 67-68, 87-97; Sullivan,
supra note 21, at 721, 728.
1993 S. Ct. at 2108-09.
'1Id. at 2092-96. The point is explicit in Justice White's concurring opinion. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion is more cryptic but seems to suggest the same point.
1971d.
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tablished a regulatory structure under which broadcasters are subject to
general oversight in the public interest but nonetheless retain substantial
independent "journalistic discretion."' 98 Under this approach, broadcasters presumably reject the advertisements in their independent capacities.' FCC acquiescence amounts to no more than the performance of
a function compatible with the Commission's role as general overseer
in the public interest, an overseer divorced from the particular exercise
of journalistic discretion involved in the case. 20 ' The analysis calls to
mind the problems encountered by the legendary tailor who found himself instructed by the King to sew a vest with sleeves. Yet it is intriguing
and, in an area in which paradoxes are to be expected, not without
appeal. Contrary to the earlier conclusions reached by Judge Wright,
the three Justices find no "symbiotic relationship" between the broadcast licensee and the FCC under the Communications Act. 2 1' Public
2
Utilities Commission v. Pollak2 °-in
1
which the Court had found government action in the approval by a public agency of loudspeakers for
a bus system-is distinguished on at least three grounds:
Here, Congress has not established a regulatory scheme for broadcast
licensees as pervasive as the regulation of public transportation in
Pollak. More important, as we have noted, Congress has affirmatively
indicated in the Communications Act that certain journalistic decisions are for the licensee, subject only to the restrictions imposed by
evaluation of its overall performance under the public interest standard. In Pollak there was no suggestion that Congress had considered
worthy of protection the carrier's interest in exercising discretion over
the content of communications forced on passengers. A more basic
distinction, perhaps, between Pollak and this case is that Pollak was
concerned with a transportation
utility that itself derives no protection
2
from the First Amendment. 1
It is true, of course, that differences exist between broadcast regulation
and the regulation of public utilities like bus companies. Individual
programming decisions and changes are not routinely examined in the
way that changes in utility services are. Yet, it must be conceded that
few major program decisions are taken without some thought for FCC
"Id. at 2091, 2102-06.
"'See id. at 2090, 2102-05.

"Id. at 2094.
20d.
- 2343 U.S. 451 (1952).
2m93 S. Ct. at 2095.
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attitudes and the possibility of difficulty at license renewal time." 4 Even
before the license has expired, broadcasters who offend their audience
may find themselves required to respond to complaints lodged with the
FCC2" 5-as, indeed, the very cases in issue demonstrate. Thus one might
suppose that pervasiveness of regulation is not the ground on which
chiefly to rely in distinguishng Pollak. The other grounds, however, are
somewhat more appealing. The Chief Justice suggests, in this minority
portion of his opinion, that a right of access would not only undermine
Congressional efforts to establish a system of "essentially private broadcast journalism," it would also do much to undermine the most basic
premises upon which free expression rests:
More profoundly, it would be anomalous for us to hold, in the name
of promoting the constitutional guarantees of free expression, that the
day-to-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees are subject to the
kind of restraints urged by respondents. To do so in the name of the
First Amendment would be a contradiction. Journalistic discretion
would in many ways be lost to the rigid limitations that the First
Amendment imposes on government. Application of such standards to
broadcast licensees would be antithetical to the very ideal of vigorous,
challenging debate on issues of public interest. Every licensee is already
held accountable
for the totality of its performance of public interest
2
obligations. 11
One can' find this passage both appealing and troublesome. Its
central thesis-that a right of access is at odds with robust debate-will
be discussed at some length later. Yet this thesis in itself is surely
insufficient to resolve the government action issue unless the first
amendment is given more nearly absolute sway than the Chief Justice
seems prepared to do in this context. As the last sentence of the quoted
passage makes clear, broadcasters, though their individual programming decisions may be made in the exercise of journalistic discretion,
remain, nonetheless, accountable in the public interest. Nothing in the
opinion threatens the fairness doctrine; the question of the constitutionality of an access doctrine imposed on broadcasters is expressly reserved
in this portion of the opinion;2 7 and a majority of the Court-including
the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist-appear later to suppose that
2"See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 723-24; Note, The PublicInterest in Balanced Programming
Content: The Case For FCC Regulation of Broadcaster'sFormat Changes, supra note 5, at 940.
'See Robinson, supra note 21, at 118-21.
293 S. Ct. at 2095.
2"Id. at 2094.
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a limited right of access might one day be recognized."' 8 Thus it is not
at all clear that the first amendment, as it applies to broadcast regulation, is enough to affect the question of government action on more than
a somewhat troublesome ad hoc basis.
The point is clearer when one considers the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Douglas. He assumes that commercial broadcasters are not
engaged in government action and, reasoning from that assumption,
concludes not only that a right of access need not be imposed by the
FCC but that the fairness doctrine itself is unconstitutional under the
first amendment. 2 Though he does not quite say so, his opinion suggests that most of the public interest standards for program content-indeed, most of the licensing procedures established by the FCC
under the Communications Act of 1934-are probably also unconstitutional.210 For its value as precedent, one can agree with his opinion while
recognizing that it probably is, in Professor Harry Kalven's phrase, "an
insight more fundamental than we can use." 21' Broadcasting is simply
not likely to be "de-regulated" at this date.2 12 But Justice Douglas'
opinion is useful, nonetheless, because it suggests the conclusions that
one might ordinarily expect from a finding that broadcast licensees'
judgments as to program selection are essentially private. If one were
prepared to reach these conclusions on the basis of traditional first
amendment thinking, then it would not be particularly troublesome in
conceptual terms to employ similar first amendment premises to resolve
the initial question of government action. In effect, one would call upon
the kind of presumption that appeared in Chicago Joint Board or
Resident Participationof Denver, Inc. v. Love. To be sure, that is not

what Justice Douglas himself does. He assumes no government action,
on
but only because he has been unsuccessful in persuading the Court 21
other occasions that government licensees are government agencies.
But his reasoning still possesses something of the conceptual consistency
which is lacking in the opinion of the Chief Justice.
It is quite possible, however, to accept the Chief Justice's opinion
for what it is: an attempt to deal with the never simple government
action concept in an area which does not lend itself to ready analogies
mSee id.at 2100-01.
"'Id. at 2110-12.
"'See id.at 2110-17.
'"Kalven, supra note 21, at 30-32.
"2'See id. at 30; Robinson, supra note 21, at 85-86.
2I193 S. Ct. at 2110.
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with earlier cases.2 14 That is, indeed, the view taken by Mr. Justice

Stewart in a separate concurring opinion:
The problem before us, however, is too complex to admit of solution
by simply analogizing to cases in very different areas. For we deal here
with the electronic press, that is itself protected from Government by
the First Amendment. Before woodenly accepting analogies from cases

dealing with quasi-public racial discrimination, regulated industries
other than the press, or "company towns," we must look more closely
at the structure of
broadcasting and the limits of governmental regula21 5
tion of licensees.

A more conventional view of the question is taken by Mr. Justice
Brennan, who is joined in a dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall.
Although Justice Brennan acknowledges that there is no single test for
deciding "whether particular conduct must be deemed private or governmental," ' he finds present in the case indicia which have contributed to findings of governmental action in other cases: the use of public
resources (in this case, the electromagnetic spectrum);2 17 the establish-

ment of preferred positions through the discriminating exercise of the
licensing power; 218 the existence of "continuing and pervasive" government regulation; 29 and the particular involvement of the government in
the very issues in the case-issues which are resolved by the FCC in
favor of the broadcasters' position in at least partial reliance upon its
own fairness doctrine. 22 Referring to the last of these indicia, Justice

Brennan notes that the FCC has not merely acquiesced in but has
affirmatively approved the broadcasters' policies.22 ' In these circum-

stances, he argues, Pollak cannot meaningfully be distinguished:
Although the Chief Justice, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, strains valiantly to distinguish Pollak, he offers
nothing more than the proverbial "distinctions without a difference."
Here, as in Pollak, the broadcast licensees operate "under the regulatory supervision of

. .

.an agency authorized by Congress." And,

2

"See Jaffe, supra note 21, at 782; Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, supra note 21, at

642-44; cf. Kalven, supra note 21, at 37-45.
21593 S. Ct. at 2102.
11 1d. at 2121.
1111d. at 2122.
'1d. at 2122-23.
1"Id. at 2123.
=-Id. at 2124-25.
211d. But cf. Jaffe, supra note 21, at 783; Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, supra note
21, at 646-47.
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again as in Pollak, that agency received "protests" against the challenged policy and, after formal consideration, "dismissed" the complaints on the ground that the "public interest, convenience and necess-

ity" were not "impaired" by that policy. Indeed, the argument for
finding "governmental action" here is even stronger than in Pollak, for
this case concerns not an incidental activity of a bus company but,
rather, the primary activity of the regulated entities - communication.122

Thus, he concludes that FCC participation in the broadcasters' position

is so substantial that government action is implicated inescapably in the
broadcasters' action.
One can wonder about this issue which the Court has left unresolved.2 31 In particular, if broadcast licensees are not engaged in government action when, with FCC approval, they refuse to allow paying
advertisers to air particular points of view, then one may ask whether
the print media could ever be found to be so engaged in any circumstances not involving the kind of outright ownership and control represented, for example, in state college publications.2 4 Surely operation
under the Failing Newspaper Act would not be enough, for the analogy
between the issues in Democratic National Committee and the issues
one would expect in the failing newspaper case would almost certainly
be greater than the analogies to other state action cases not involving
the media.
An effort to resolve the issue as to broadcasting however, would
be not only an essentially pointless undertaking but, a misdirected one
as well. For seven members of the Court in Democratic National
Committee are prepared either to hold or to assume that governmental
action is involved in the case. Yet only two among this number agree
that this conclusion requires the recognition of an affirmative right of
access. The remaining five either hold or assume instead that the alternative regulatory scheme-the one imposed by Congress and developed
by the FCC-is sufficient to answer whatever claims to access the proponents may have. This division of opinion invites a more important set
of observations than does the question of governmental action itself.
229 3 S. Ct. at 2125.

mSee Jaffe, supra note 21, at 782-87.
22'See, e.g., Lee v. Board of Regents, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969), affd, 441 F.2d
1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In these cases, access
followed a finding of state action in the operation of state college and public high school publications. Cf. Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Poole, 324 F. Supp. 368 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
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The discussion begins with a somewhat more precise restatement
of the disposition of the issues in the case. I have referred in my earlier
summary to "the majority." Perhaps "coalition" would have been better. Clearly, a majority agrees that the first amendment does not require
an individual right of access to the broadcast media under existing
regulation. In fact, all of the Justices but Brennan and Marshall agree
with this proposition. A smaller majority, however-or a coalition-agrees that this is so essentially because even if government action
is assumed, the existing regulatory scheme provides for balanced coverage of public issues under a system which makes licensees accountable
as editorial trustees. Justices White, Blackmun and Powell hold as
much;2 2 the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist join in this opinion in
considered dictum.22 1 It is dictum only because they have previously
found no state action, and one would suppose that it is rather carefully
considered since the Chief Justice himself has written the only extensive
opinion on the point and since Justice Rehnquist-the only member of
the Court who concurs with everything the Chief Justice has said-has
written no opinion of his own. 2 21 Thus, while there is no holding on the
point, it appears to represent at least the considered judgment of a
majority.
The point itself is worth isolating because it suggests some rather
important insights into what may be required when government is implicated in judgments concerning the content of the media. The central
issues are whether a right of access necessarily follows a finding of
government action and, if not, what alternatives may be permissible or
required. These issues are first suggested clearly in the concurring opinions of Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart.
As previously mentioned, Justice Douglas has assumed that there
was no government action because he has been unsuccessful in persuading the Court that licensees are government agencies. But he does observe that if licensees were government agencies, a right of access would
follow "inexorably" because "a licensee, like an agency of the government, would within limits of its time be bound to disseminate all views
r2CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2108-09 (1973).
22id.
2it

at 2096-99.

is also worth pointing out that their opinion here is a holding on the question whether

the public interest standard of the Communications Act requires access. Since they agree that "the

'public interest' standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles," id. at 2096,

they are not far from a holding on the substantive first amendment issue itself. But see id. at 212021 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf.id.at 2106 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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it would be unable by reason of the First Amendment to 'abridge'

some sectors of thought in favor of others." 21 Justice Douglas does not
make it entirely clear whether he would find a limited right of access to
be enough, but one can assume that he would since he refers approvingly
to "the thesis" of Justice Brennan who argues for no more than limited
access. 29 Justice Stewart, on the other hand, would not accept limitations on access if government action were found. Instead, he argues that
a finding that "broadcasters are government" would require common
carrier status--by which one supposes that he means essentially a
first-come, first-served system.
In either case, the major premise seems unassailable: if government
action is involved in content selection, surely the involvement must be
subject to constraints which favor no particular point of view. The
conclusions as to a right of access, however-whether limited or unlimited-are less clear. If some speech must be abridged-and a clear
majority of the Court in both Red Lion and Democratic National

Committee has recognized that it must be in a medium which cannot
always accommodate everyone who would speak at the same
timeP-then what surely follows is any system which is reasonably
designed to operate without particular favoritism. A common carrier
system might meet this test in a rather narrow sense, although one could
argue with justification that it would not, in Professor Thomas Emerson's formulation, "best promote the system of freedom of expression.'es - A limited right of access, carefully controlled, might also
provide an adequate system. But then, so may the fairness doctrine and
its companion concept of editorial trusteeship. One would suppose on
general principles that if more than one system may be independently
1"Id. at 2110 (Douglas, J., concurring).

2id.; see id. at 2136-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2Id. at 2104-05 (Stewart, J., concurring).

2'"Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
22'. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 663 (1970). See Marks, supra note
21, at 981-82. See also text accompanying notes 197, 213, infra. But see Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), in which Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court suggested:
Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number of licensees,
in a Nation of 200,000,000, the Government could surely have decreed that each frequency should be shared among all or some of those who wish to use it, each being
assigned a portion of the broadcast day or broadcast week.
Id. at 390-91.
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constitutional in terms of substantive first amendment requirements, the
choice rests with Congress and whatever administrative agency it may
select. This appears essentially to be the reasoning employed by the five
Justices and, as to this point in the case, their disposition seems defensible.13
In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Brennan argues with
some force that the fairness doctrine is inadequate because it depends
too much upon the concept of trusteeship:
Thus, the Fairness Doctrine does not in any sense require broadcasters
to allow "non-broadcaster" speakers to use the airwaves to express
their own views on controversial issues of public importance. On the
contrary, broadcasters may meet their fairness responsibilities through
presentation of carefully edited news programs, panel discussions, interviews, and documentaries. As a result, broadcasters retain almost
exclusive control over the selection of issues and viewpoints to be
covered, the manner of presentation and, perhaps most important, who
shall speak. Given this doctrinal framework, I can only conclude that
the Fairness Doctrine, standing alone, is insufficient-in theory as well
as in practice-to provide the kind of "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen" exchange of views to which the public is constitutionally entitled.24
Critical of what he deems the unwarranted "interposition of journalistic
middlemen," Justice Brennan argues that in a powerful medium specifically dedicated to communication some individual right to participate
directly is required."'
It is clear, however, that he does not envision an unlimited right of
access or a complete abandonment of broadcast licensees' "journalistic
supervision over the use of their facilities. 2 36 Instead, he emphasizes-as had Judge Wright-that what is at stake is the "allocation of
advertising time-airtime that broadcasters regularly relinquish to others without the retention of significant editorial control. ' 2 17 Essentially,
the argument is that broadcasters who make commercial time available
should not be permitted to exclude all non-commercial advertising:
"'See Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, supra note 21, at 650-53, in which the author
argues that while "judicial recognition of a right of access would be consistent with the underlying
policies of the first amendment, it does not follow that recognition is constitutionally compelled."
2'93 S. Ct. at 2128-29.
mid. at 2130.

"Id. at 2135.
237d.
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Viewed in this context, the absolute ban on editorial advertising
seems particularly offensive because, although broadcasters refuse to
sell any airtime whatever to groups or individuals wishing to speak out
on controversial issues of public importance, they make such airtime
readily available to those "commercial" advertisers who seek to peddle
their goods and services to the public. Thus, as the system now operates, any person wishing to market a particular brand of beer, soap,
toothpaste, or deodorant has direct, personal and instanteous access
to the electronic media. He can present his own message, in his own
words, in any format he selects and at a time of his own choosing. Yet
a similar individual seeking to discuss war, peace, pollution, or the
suffering of the poor is denied this right to speak. Instead, he is compelled to rely on the beneficence of a corporate "trustee" appointed
by the Government to argue his case for him.
It has long been recognized, however, that although access to
public forums may be subjected to reasonable 'time, place, and manner' regulations, "[s]elective exclusions from a public forum may not
be based on content alone. . . ." Here, of course, the differential
treatment accorded "commercial" and "controversial" speech clearly
violates that principle. Moreover, and not without some irony the
favored treatment given "commercial" speech under the existing
scheme clearly reverses traditional First Amendment priorities. For it
has generally been understood that "commercial" speech enjoys less
First Amendment protection than speech directed at the discussion of
controversial issues of public importance.238
While these arguments have been made from time to time by the
access proponents-and, of course, by Judge Wright-the logic has
never seemed self-evident.2 39 If there were no constitutional difference
between commercial speech and speech concerning public issues, it
would follow that one could not be favored over the other. But as Justice
Brennan himself acknowledges, the Court has in effect excluded commercial speech from the reach of first amendment protection;2 4 indeed,
it has reaffirmed this position in the last term. 241 Since commercial
speech is not protected, it is hardly "ironic" to find discrimination
2id. at 2135-36 (footnotes omitted).
"See Note, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, supra note 5, at 1043-44,

cf., Jaffe, supra note 21, at 775-80. Professor Jaffe argues that the fairness doctrine ought not be
expansively applied to advertising in cases which do not raise fairly clear public controversies.
"'°See Valetine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
241

Pittsburgh Press Co. v. The Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 93 S. Ct. 2553 (1973).

The Court holds that bans on sex discrimination in newspaper want-ads do not violate the first

amendment.
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between commercial advertising and public-issue advertising. The fal-

lacy in Justice Brennan's argument lies in the supposition that all "advertising" should be treated alike. Broadcasters presumably may discriminate among "purely commercial" advertisements: indeed they do,

as the absence of liquor and condom commercials will suggest. 2 2 But
they may not display favoritism in their coverage of public issues. When

advertisements raising public issues are accepted, these advertisements
surely must be considered by the licensees in their overall assessment
of their coverage.243 In this respect, broadcasters must be discriminat-

ing, in a sense, in order not to discriminate.
The reason for this discrimination is suggested in Justice Brennan's
own words taken from an earlier passage in his opinion: "[U]nlike the
streets, parks, public libraries and other 'forums' that we have held to
be appropriate for the exercise of First Amendment rights, the broadcast media are dedicated specifically to communication." 24 4 This is undoubtedly true, 245 but it can lead to rather different conclusions about
what may be required of parks as opposed to television stations. Parks
and similar forums which are generally open to the public may not ban
the exercise of first amendment rights, at least when their exercise is not
wholly inconsistent with the intended use of the forum .24 In these for247
ums, however, a somewhat crude common carrier status is imposed.
It works well enough in political terms because, by tradition, we are
accustomed to it and because demand for space rarely exceeds supply;
and it raises no important problems of invidious discrimination among
competing ideas because, virtually by definition, a common carrier con-

cept involves no selection of content at all. 24 Parks presumably are free
"'Professor Robinson has suggested that FCC regulation of ordinary commercial advertising
has been largely confined to controlling excessive spots. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 109-11.
2'"If a [commercial] message advocates one side of an important public issue, the fairness
doctrine should apply." Note, Media and the FirstAmendment in a Free Society, supra note 5,
at 1040; see id. at 1039-42. But cf. Jaffe, supra note 21, at 780.
2"CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2132-33 (1973).
"'But cf.Note, Concepts of the BroadcastMedia Under the FirstAmendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal,supra note 21, at 100-02. The author argues that broadcasting is not necessarily a public forum. The argument is respectable but, assuming arguendo a finding of a governmental action, it is difficult to sustain. In any case, the question of access need not turn on whether
broadcasting is a public forum or not.
"'See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
2 7
4 [n other words, speech is permitted essentially on a first-come, first-served basis, subject to
reasonable "traffic" regulations.
"'But see Marks, supra note 21, at 986-87; in which the author observes that parade permits
may be issued in response to content. Thus he suggests that a permit to march down New York's
Fifth Avenue on St. Patrick's Day would go to the Irish, not the DAR, assuming that both wanted
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to regulate commercial advertising, however, or to ban it altogether;
there is simply no complete correlation between the presence of commercial advertising and the acceptability of protected speech. I say "no
complete correlation" because there is a line of cases, exemplified by
Kissinger v. New York City TransitAuthority,4 ' which hold that when
commercial advertising is displayed or otherwise accepted in a public
place, other protected speech may not be excluded on grounds which
would independently contravene the first amendment."' Thus, as in
Kissinger, if commercial posters are displayed in New York subway
tunnels, antiwar posters may not be excluded simply because their message is offensive. 51 While I think these cases might be explained on the
grounds that the existence of commercial advertising simply demonstrates that the "forum" is indeed "open", it is not necessary to reach
that position. For these cases do not sustain either of the two further
propositions necessary to Justice Brennan's thesis. They do not hold
that a complete ban on commercial speech forecloses the question
whether protected speech must be allowed. 12 More important, they do
not hold that protected speech must be accepted on a basis of complete
parity with commercial advertising, or indeed, that protected speech
must be accepted on a common carrier basis; the latter is simply assumed, and with some justification in a forum like a park or a subway
tunnel which is not specifically dedicated to communication and is not
subject to comprehensive regulation intended to draw a balance among
competing claims to first amendment expression. But broadcasting is
unlike parks or subway tunnels precisely because it is dedicated to communication and because it is subject to speech-oriented regulation. If
that regulation is accepted, as Justice Brennan seems generally willing
to do, then again, surely all that is required is that it be designed not to
favor a particular point of view. A limited right of access might complement that design or even replace it in large part. But to accept the
a permit at the same time. He is probably right, and he would certainly be right if his example
were transferred, say, to Chicago where even the River runs green on the good Saint's day. But
exceptions simply prove the rule. Normally, this kind of conflict would not be encountered and
normally parade permits would simply issue upon request.
211274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

2-0E.g., Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 430 (1967); Hillside Community Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 76 Wash. 2d 63, 455 P.2d
350 (1969).
21274 F. Supp. at 442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2"But cf Note, Concepts of the Broadcast Media Under the First Amendment: A Reevalualion and a Proposal,supra note 21, at 93 n.54.
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concept as possible is not to accept it as a necessity under the first
amendment 253-and certainly not simply on the grounds that editorial
advertisements are "advertising."
Of course, Justice Brennan's position does not rest entirely on this
ground. He also argues that the fairness doctrine is seriously flawed
because, in practice, broadcasters find that it is in their own self-interest
to limit discussion, and also because the discussion permitted tends to
be a didactic reflection of "prevailing opinion" offered by those whose
own points of view are merely "representative. ' 2 5 4 Indeed, he adds,
broadcasters are required by the fairness doctrine to decide whether
particular points of view even deserve discussion.2 5 These limitations,
in his judgment, make the fairness doctrine insufficient to promote the
full and free discussion which the first amendment ordinarily presupposes. 256 Although these observations are not new, they are important
and essentially correct. It is not at all clear, however, that the right of
access for which Justice Brennan argues would escape these limitations.
I shall argue later that a controlled right of access to all the media would
be afflicted by all of these limitations and would lead to additional
dangers as well. Yet even in the narrower context of the broadcast
media, it is possible to see that the limitations of the fairness doctrine
stem essentially from the same conceptual cost which would be borne
by a controlled right of access.
The conceptual cost is ideological balance, and it is imposed as a
matter of substantive first amendment doctrine. For if government is
implicated in decisions or regulations directly affecting the ideological
content of the media on any basis other than a common carrier principle, then it surely follows that no judgment may be taken that does not
contribute essentially to the establishment of a representative balance
among competing ideologies. Indeed, no other judgment can be taken
if the government is to avoid the ideological favoritism which, by general consent, it may not show. In broadest terms, this limitation means
that the medium affected by government loses, to that extent, its ability
to commit itself. In the context of broadcasting, it means more specifically that editorials beget replies and that individual points of view are
limited in favor of opposing points of view. 257 It probably does not mean
mNote, Free Speech and the Mass Media, supra note 21, at 651.
"'CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2130-31 (1973).
21Id. at 2131.
25I8d.

1'7his is the immediate function of the fairness doctrine. But the fairness doctrine must be
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that unopposed views must be excluded on the account (although the
thought is an interesting one) nor does it mean that "news" reporting
and accompanying explanatory comment need be balanced2 5 -here the
theory, shakier now, must rest on the implicit premise of journalistic
objectivity; but it clearly does mean that some individual expression
must be excluded, not for its own repugnance but simply because it has
been anticipated. Obviously, these requirements are at odds with traditional first amendment thinking, but they are wholly consistent with the
position in which government finds itself when, on independent grounds,

it must interfere in the process of media content selection. 2 Thus, as
Justice White observed in Red Lion, "where there are substantially
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable first amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write,
2
or publish.1 11

assessed against the FCC's still larger requirement of "balanced programming" which it imposes
on licensees under the "public interest" standard. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 111-18; Note,
Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, supra note 5, at 1031-32; cf. Sullivan, supra
note 21, at 725-26. The relationship between balanced programming and the ideological balance
referred to in the text is tenuous, not direct, since not all broadcast content involves obvious
ideology. Even so, balanced programming can be said to serve first amendment interests which
arguably would be violated if the FCC permitted broadcasters generally to program without regard
for variety or diversity in their content. See Note, The Public Interest in Balanced Programming
Content: The Casefor FCC Regulation of Broadcasters'Format Changes, supra note 5, at 94243.
2-rhe fairness doctrine does not apply to news reporting and commentary within news pro.
grams, although it is probable that deliberate fraud or bias would bring sanctions. See Note, The
First Amendment and Regulation of Television News, supra note 5, at 747-48, 765; Note, Media
and the First Amendment in a FreeSociety, supra note 5, at 941-44.
"'For the most part, they are nothing more than extensions of standard fairness doctrine
theory. The most difficult questions arise in the context of entertainment programming. Although
the FCC traditionally has displayed little interest in entertainment beyond requiring that it be offset
by at least some more serious fare, it can certainly be argued that entertainment may reflect
ideology. When it does, then, as in the case of commercial advertising which raises public issues,
the requirement of balance arguably ought to be applicable. This general requirement might be
overcome in most cases, however, on the ground that the ideological content reflected in standard
entertainment fare is essentially de minimis. See generally Note, The FairnessDoctrineand Entertainment Programming: All in the Family, 7 GA. L. REv. 554 (1973); Note, The Public Interest
in Balanced Programming Content: The Case for FCC Regulation of Broadcasters' Format
Changes, supra note 5, at 937, 942-44, 963; Note, Media and the First Amendment in a Free
Society, supra note 21, at 944-49; Note, Concepts of the BroadcastMedia Under the FirstA mendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal,supra note 21, at 99-100.
20 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). The comprehensive regulatory theory suggested here is similar to theories offered by Professor Barron some years ago in
defense of the fairness doctrine. It was his view that licensees could be seen as "governmental
actors" and the fairness doctrine therefore justified as a necessary limitation upon government
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The requirement of balance also surely cannot turn, as both Justice
Stewart and Justice Brennan appear to suppose, on whether licensees
are government or are merely affected by government action. Instead,
the requirement arises in the latter case pro tanto, and becomes complete as government involvement is complete. If government action is
implicated in the entire licensing transaction, licensees are wholly subject to the requirement of balance. 261 Yet as individual bits of expression
contribute to a balance, each bit is entirely free of restraint; to this
extent, the licensees themselves retain the right to advocacy within the
larger framework of their obligation to provide a balance. This is the
point I understand Professor Emerson to make in part in his discussion
of the concept of the editorial trustee:
The licensee therefore can only be considered as the agent of the
government, or trustee of the public, in a process of further allocation.
Hence the licensee would have no direct First Amendment rights of
his own, except as to his own expression. The First Amendment right
would run from the individual or group seeking to engage in expression, or seeking to listen, to the government; not from the licensee
(except as to his own expression) to the government. This would mean
that there could be no censorship of the actual user of the facilities,
but there could be controls over the Licensee to assure that he made a
FIir allocation of the limited facilities both to users and to listeners.
indeed, would the requirements of the
Only through such a system,
62
First Amendment be met.1
As Professor Emerson says, this was essentially the Court's position in Red Lion. It appears still to be the position of the five Justiceswho concur in the judgment that the fairness doctrine and editorial
trustees are adequate under the first amendment. To be sure, there are
many references in the Chief Justice's opinion to the licensees' "journalistic discretion." But they are never far from equally insistent references
to licensees' "accountability" for their performance or to the "congressional objective of balanced coverage of public issues." These references
can be harmonized, I think, only when it is recognized that the discrepower to censor. See Barron, In Defense of Fairness:A First Amendment Rationalefor Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine,supra note 5, at 44-45. Assuming governmental action in the licensing
process, his view seems correct, although the requirement of ideological balance actually subsumes
the fairness doctrine and, in the process, undoes his later first amendment arguments for individual
access to the broadcast media.
"'This would be true, however, only to the extent that program content were ideologically
oriented. Other programming would remain subject to the more general public interest standards
by the Communications Act.
imposed
2
"'T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 663 (1970).
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tion here is quite unlike the discretion of convenional editors who are
free to select for publication whatever they please. The discretion of a
licensee is the discretion of an editorial trustee accountable to the public
for balanced coverage of public issues. This proposition is virtually
explicit in the Chief Justice's opinion, as is the proposition that the
established system itself is substantively adequate; what is implicit in the
two propositions is that the concept of balanced coverage is not merely
an acceptable Congressional
policy but is an expression of first amend26 3
ment doctrine as well.
Editorial discretion in this context must therefore mean, as I have
suggested, not the conventional discretion to discriminate but rather to
be discriminating in the pursuit of balance. Indeed, one can see the
licensee as a kind of surrogate, doing essentially what must be done
under any system which does not depend on a first-come, first-served
allocation of resources but depends instead on government supervision.
The licensee might be replaced as functionary, but the function must be
performed. This inevitability seems to be what the Chief Justice has in
mind when he describes what the FCC would find it necessary to do in
administering a limited right of access:
Under a constitutionally commanded and government supervised
right-of-access system urged by respondents and mandated by the
Court of Appeals, the Commission would be required to oversee far
more of the day-to-day operations of braodcasters' conduct, deciding
such questions as whether a particular individual or group has had
sufficient opportunity to present its viewpoint and whether a particular
viewpoint has already been sufficiently aired. 64
With these observations, one can again consider Justice Brennan's
objections to the fairness doctrine. He is, of course, correct: it works
imperfectly.265 Yet the controlled right of access for which he contends
would be subject to the same conceptual requirement of balance as the
fairness doctrine and to almost certainly as many practical impediments. In the circumstances, one can accept the position of the five
Justices not so much because it represents the best choice as because no
2
other choice is clearly better. 1
2Cf., Jaffe, supra note 21, at 773-74.
2
"CBS
2

v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2098 (1973).
65See Blake, supra note 21, at 82-86.
"'It should be emphasized that the requirement of ideological balance depends on a finding

of governmental involvement in the determination of content. It is possible to limit that finding
and thus to fashion alternative rationales substantially limiting the scope of the balance require-
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Two final points need to be made concerning this analysis. First, it
must be conceded that the analysis itself is tendentious. As Justice
Brennan notes, the Court does not quite hold that the fairness doctrine
ment as well as the fairness doctrine. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Democratic National
Committee proceeds readily from the initial assumption of no governmental action. No rationale
is free from difficulty, however, so long as it accepts the public interest standard of the Communications Act as applicable to ideological programming.
For example, one commentator has suggested that "scarcity is the central theory of broadcast
regulation, and balancing is brought in only to cover the one area the scarcity theory may not reach
marginal issues projected into controversy by a licensee." Marks, supranote 21, at 993. The author
adds:
The courts must nonetheless be sure that the Commission's enforcement of public service
requirements does not infringe licensee free speech rights. The sanctions available in the
renewal process, and the other less drastic means of enforcement open to the Commission, must be applied so as not to punish protected speech in contravention of [Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931]. Accordingly, the Commission can avoid punishment
of all protected speech only if it denies renewal for what is not broadcast. That is, the
FCC should deny renewal only for failure to cover a subject whose coverage was necessary for adequate community broadcast service. To restate this rule in terms of any views
which the licensee expresses over the air, the Commission should be prohibitedfrom
denying renewal because of any broadcast.In that way, the licensees would know that
views they expressed could not result in administrative sanctions.
Id. (Emphasis in original). However, whether the Commission ostensibly enforces the public interest standard by denying renewals for what is or is not broadcast, its power of review is conceptually
the same. What is broadcast will have to be considered and may necessarily have to be limited in
order to accommodate what otherwise would not be broadcast. It is difficult to see how the charge
of government involvement in the determination of content can be avoided under either approach.
This seems to be recognized by Professor Robinson, who argues that the Commission may not
establish general standards of programming acceptability' under a public interest standard. Yet he
dismisses as "extreme" and "naive" the argument that the Commission should be confined to
regulation of "only the technological aspects of radio and television." Instead, he observes:
[I]t does not necessarily follow that because the Commission may not constitutionally impose its own standards of orthodox programming or its own standards of balance,
fairness, and diversity that it may not in general insist that a licensee investigate and be
responsive to demonstrated needs of his community. The first amendment does not
require that a licensee must be permitted to operate a radio facility purely in his private
and selfish interest with no concern for public needs and interests. The first amendment
comes into play, however, when the Commission, in the name of reviewing a licensee's
responsiveness, begins to concern itself with programming or program operations to the
point of establishing standards of acceptable and nonacceptable programming. It has
already reached and gone beyond this point.
Robinson, supra note 21, at 162-63. Certainly, the Commission has no business engaging in
conventional censorship. It would also undoubtedly be better for the Commission to impose standards flexibly suited to local situations than to insist on a blind application of a single national
standard. And it would be possible for licensees, in their role as trustees, to be given more initial
discretion than they now have to determine those standards. However, if the Commission is to
remain the final arbiter, it is again difficult to avoid the argument that it is engaged in the
determination of content. Indeed, one could argue that clear standards-even somewhat silly
ones-are less likely in the long run to result in suppression and censorship than is a "simple"
value-laden prohibition against selfish unconcern.
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is an adequate alternative to access, although a majority seems to think
so. Nor is the role of balance as constitutional doctrine explicit in the
case, although, again, I think it fairly implicit. The second point, however, tends to offset the concessions in the first. For reasons discussed
later, it seems clear that whether or not balance is required by the first
amendment as an affirmative matter, it is wanted by most of the access
proponents on practical grounds which will, in political terms, require
acknowledgment. Thus the practical limitations implicit in the concept
of balance will almost certainly influence the development of the access
doctrine in any event.
Meanwhile, the net effect of Democratic National Committee can
be fairly easily summarized. It is clear that nothing in the case forbids
Congress or the FCC to impose an affirmative right of access to the
broadcast media. Indeed, the opinion of the Chief Justice leaves room
for a change of regulatory policy which would convert broadcasters
from their position as editorial trustees into mere common carriers.
Although virtually unthinkable as a political proposition, a conversion
is still possible under a view which assigns broadcasters to a unique first
amendment role predicated on spectrum-imposed scarcity. 6 In any
event, five Justices assume that "at some future date Congress or the
Commission-or the broadcasters-may devise some kind of limited
right of access that is both practicable and desirable."2 ' In short, the
question of access to the broadcast media is not foreclosed. It is simply
transferred from the courts to the commission and Congress where, one
may safely speculate, it will continue to be vigorously pursued.
It is equally clear that the cable television access policies already
established by the commission are unaffected by the case. In fact, the
Chief Justice cites the commission's cable regulations with evident approval 69-presumably in order to-suggest that the commission has not
been stubbornly unwilling to require access in circumstances which warrant it. To be sure, the reference is in the briefest dictum, but there is
at least no suggestion that the validity of the regulations is in doubt.
When Democratic National Committee is considered with the deci0
sion in Tornillo,27
it is fair to say that the access doctrine has arrived
at a kind of crossroads. Its course is not yet certain, but there is at least
2

'See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-91 (1969).
'"CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (1973).
2
"'Id. at 2100-01.
2 0
1 No. 43,009 (Fla. Sup. Ct., filed July 18, 1973), rehearingdenied, Oct. 10, 1973, [hereinafter
cited as Tornillo Opinion].
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the possibility that time will bring about the development of a compre-

hensive, controlled right of access to the media at large.
B.

The Tornillo Case.

Tornillo is the product of a dispute between a candidate for the
Florida Legislature and The Miami Herald, Florida's largest daily

newspaper. The Herald had published personal attacks271 directed
"At least the Supreme Court of Florida calls them attacks on Tornillo's "personal character." Tornillo Opinion 2. The characterization is somewhat unfair. The attacks were caustic, but
they were also clearly directed at Tornillos' candidacy and fitness for public office. On Wednesday,
September 20, 1972, the Herald published the following editorial:
THE STATE'S LAWS AND PAT TORNILLO
LOOK who's upholding the law!
Pat Tornillo, boss of the Classroom Teachers Association and candidate for the
State Legislature in the Oct. 3 runoff election, has denounced his opponent as lacking
"the knowledge to be a legislator, as evidenced by his failure to file a list of contributions
to and expenditures of his campaign as required by law."
Czar Tornillo calls "violation of this law inexcusable."
This is the same Pat Tornillo who led the CTA strike from February 19 to March
I, 1968, against the school children and taxpayers of Dade County. Call it whatever
you will, it was an illegal act against the public interest and clearly prohibited by the
statutes.
We cannot say it would be illegal but certainly it would be inexcusable of the voters
if they sent Pat Tornillo to Tallahassee to occupy the seat for District 103 in the House
of Representatives.
Brief for Appellant, Exhibit. L.A Second editorial appeared on Friday, September 28, 1972:
SEE PAT RUN
(Picture of empty classroom)
FROM the people who brought you this-the teacher strike of '68-:ome now
instructions on how to vote for responsible government, i.e., against Crutcher Harrison
and Ethel Beckham, for Pat Tornillo. The tracts and blurbs and bumper stickers pile
up daily in teachers' school mailboxes admist continuing pouts that the School Board
should be delivering all this at your expense. The screeds say the strike is not an issue.
We say maybe it wouldn't be were it not a part of a continuation of disregard of any
and all laws the CTA might find aggravating. Whether in defiance of zoning laws at
CTA Towers, contracts and laws during the strike, or more recently state prohibitions
against soliciting campaign funds amongst teachers, CTA says fie and try and sue
us-what's good for CTA is good for CTA and that is natural law. Tornillo's law,
maybe. For years now he has been kicking the public shin to call attention to his
shakedown statesmanship. He and whichever acerbic prexy is in alleged office have
always felt their private ventures so chock-full of public weal that we should leap at the
chance to nab the tab, be it half the Glorious Leader's salary or the dues checkoff or
anything else except perhaps mileage on the staff hydrofoil. Give him public office, says
Pat, and he will no doubt live by the Golden Rule. Our translation reads that as more
gold and more rule.
Brief for Appellant, Exhibit #3.
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against Tornillo who, in turn, demanded the right to reply"' under a
"2 Tornillo submitted two responses for publication. To the first editorial he offered the following reply:
FROM:

PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.
CTA Executive Director
1809 Brickell Avenue
Miami, Florida 33129
Legislative Candidate, District 103

TO:

MIAMI

HERALD

One Herald Plaza
Miami, Florida
PAT TORNILLO AND THE CTA RECORD
Five years ago, the teachers participated in a statewide walkout to protest deteriorating
educational conditions.
Financing was inadequate then and we now face a financial crisis.
The Herald told us that what we did was illegal and that we should use legal processes
instead. We are doing just that through legal and political action.
My candidacy is an integral part of this process.
During the past four years:
-CTA brought suit to give Dade County its share of state money to relieve local
taxpayers.
-CTA won a suit which gave public employees the right to collectively bargain.
-CTA won a suit which allowed the School Board to raise $7.8 million to aircondition schools and is helping to keep this money.
Unfortunately, the Herald dwells on past history and ignores CTA's totally legal efforts
of the past four years.
We are proud of our record.
Brief for Appellant, Exhibit #2. The second editorial brought a second reply:
FROM: PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.
CTA Executive Director
and Candidate (Dem.) for
State Rep., Dist. 103
1809 Brickell Avenue
Miami, Florida 33129
Phone: 854-0220
September 30, 1972
EDITORIAL REPLY
Since the Herald has chosen to publicly attack my record, accomplishments, and
positions on various issues, and those of the CTA, I again request that under Florida
Statute 104.38, the Heraldprint the following record of affirmative and legal action.
In, 1968, CTA signed a no-strike affidavit.
In 1969, CTA filed and won a suit in the Supreme Court of Florida, which gives
all public employees the right to bargain collectively without the right to strike.
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long standing, but never tested, Florida statute2 3 The newspaper refused; Tornillo brought suit, and the lower court found the statute unconstitutonal on its face. A majority of the Florida Supreme Court
holds, however, that the statute is consistent with the election provisions
of the Florida Constitution and with the free speech and press provisions
27 4
of both the Florida and United States Constitutions.
The statute provides that a newspaper must give equal space for
replies by political candidates who have been attacked in the newspe
per's columns:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any
candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges
said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise
attacks his official record, or gives to another free space for such
purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate immediIn 1971, CTA filed the Tornillo suit, which enabled the School Board to receive
$7.6 million and are presently cooperating with the Board in their effort to retain this
money and avoid further financial chaos.
Since 1968, CTA has reimbursed the taxpayers of Dade County for the full salary
and all fringe benefits of its President.
Since 1970, CTA has not used the school mail service to communicate with its

members.
Since 1970, CTA has paid all costs of payroll deduction of dues for its members.
We have attempted to obey all the laws of the state, not intentionally violating any,
while continuing our efforts to alert the public to the impending financial crisis facing

the schools.
We have, however, also retained our belief in the right of public employees to
engage in political activity and to support the candidates of our choice, as is the right
of any citizen in this great country of ours.
Aye, there's the rub.
Brief for Appellant, Exhibit # 4. The Herald did not publish either reply as such, although in its
regular news columns it did report the substance of Tornillo's defense. Tornillo's replies were
denied free publication on the basis of the Herald's long-standing policy against allowing its
"letters" column to be used by political candidates during election campaigns. The policy reflects
the paper's editorial judgment that political candidates should not be permitted to "swamp" the
letters column to the exclusion of the average writer. It is feared that this would be the practical
result if the column were opened to candidates.
nFLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (Supp. 1972). The statute was earlier declared unconstitutional
at the trial court level in State v. News-Journal Corporation (County Judge's Court, Volusia
County, February 14, 1972) (opinion attached as Exhibit A to Brief for Appellee. Tornillo v. The
Miami Herald Publ. Co., No. 43,009 (Fla. Sup. Ct., filed July 18, 1973). The Attorney General
of Florida refused to appeal from this ruling because of his own doubts about the statute's constitutionality. See Brief for Appellee at 2-3.
2"Tornillo Opinion 2-3.
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ately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for
such reply, provided such reply does not take up more space than the
matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .... "I
Although the lower court had found the language of the statute impermissibly vague, the Florida Supreme Court has little difficulty construing the statute to avoid this objection. The court interprets the statute
to mean that the reply must be "wholly responsive" to the attack and
must be neither defamatory nor vulgar or profane? 8
It is in the context of first amendment doctrine that the case is of
major importance. The court holds that the statute does not violate the
first amendment because it "supports the freedom of the press in its true
meaning-that is, the right of the reader to the whole story, rather than
half of it-and without which the reader would be 'blacked out' as to
the other side of the controversy. ' 2 7 Thus in the majority's view, the
statute promotes, rather than inhibits, freedom of expression:
The statute here under consideration is designed to add to the flow of
information and ideas and does not constitute an incursion upon First
Amendment rights or a prior restraint, since no specified newspaper
content is excluded. There is nothing prohibited but rather it requires,
2
in the interest of full and fair discussion, additional information.
This is, of course, a major thesis of the access proponents. Other echoes
of their arguments also abound in he opinion. There are repeated references to the need for freedom of expression "for all the people and not
merely for a select few."279 The court acknowledges both the assumptions of media influence and the resulting economic predicate:
The right of the public to know all sides of a controversy and from
such information to be able to make an enlightened choice is being
jeopardized by the growing concentration of the ownership of the mass
media into fewer and fewer hands, resulting ultimately in a form of
private censorship. Through consolidation, syndication, acquisition of
radio and television stations and the demise of vast numbers of newspapers, competition is rapidly vanishing and news corporations are
21'FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 104.38
26
7Tornillo Opinion 10-11.
2

(Supp. 1972).

' Tornillo Opinion 12.

27Tornillo Opinion 12 (emphasis by the court).
'Tornillo Opinion 6 (emphasis in original), see Tornillo Opinion 4, 5.
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acquiring monopolistic influence over huge areas of the country.8 0
In short, the case rests principally on the concept of fairness in media
content. The theory of the case might easily be extended to support a
broader statute imposing a fairness doctrine on newspapers or a more
direct right of individual access intended to provide "both sides of controversial matters." Thus the case must be read for what it is: a straightforward assault upon the traditional position of the print media under
the first amendment.
Lacking direct precedent for its decision, the court pieces together
bits of dictum from earlier Supreme Court decisions which lend color
to its position. Thus, the court uses a passage from the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp v. Florida"' which
suggests that freedom of the press
is not an absolute but instead implies
"responsibility for its exercise.12 2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivansn
is cited for the proposition that "there is a broad societal interest in the
free flow of information to the public .... ,,2"1
Associated Press v.
United States2 5 suggests to the court that "[f]reedom of press. . . does
not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.""2 6 A particularly egregious dictum in a closing footnote to Red Lion also appears-shorn by the Florida court, however, of its introductory clause
which is included here in italics together with the remainder of the
sentence which the Court "excerpts":
A related argument, which we also put aside, is that quite apartfrom

scarcity offrequencies, technologicalor economic, Congress does not
abridge freedom of speech or press by legislation or indirectly multiplying the voices and views presented to the public through time sharing, fairness doctrines, or other devices which limit or dissipate the
power of those who sit astride the channels of communication with the
general public.27
It is not difficult to distinguish these cases. Pennekamp dealt with
criticism of the judiciary by newspapers and decided only that the criticism in question could not be made the subject of contempt since it did
'Tornillo Opinion 6.
21328 U.S. 331 (1946).
22

1 1d. at 355. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
-376 U.S. 254 (1964).

2"Tornillo Opinion 6.
-326 U.S. 1 (1945).
28 id.at 20.
2"Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 401 n.28 (1969) (emphasis added).
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not present a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. 8
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence was occasioned chiefly by his distaste
for the use of the "clear and present danger" test as legal doctrine; he
guggested, in the context of his own analysis of the issues in the case,
that freedom of the press must be tempered with responsibility. 89 As an
abstract proposition, most members of the present Supreme Court
probably would agree with Justice Frankfurter. It is by no means clear
that they would concur in its application to the issues in Tornillo-and
certainly not on the basis of Pennekamp which is itself all but irrelevant.
In New York Times, the Court held that under the first
amendment, defamatory statements concerning public officials could be
made the subject of libel actions only if published with "actual malice,"
which the Court defined as either knowing falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth.2 Although technically a decision restricting the traditional power of the states to impose sanctions for libel, New York Times
undoubtedly does support the Florida court's concern for a "free flow
of information." But nothing in the case suggests clearly that newspapers have an affirmative obligation to print unwanted matter. Indeed,
the editorial advertisement in New York Times was printed only after
it had been "approved" by the newspaper's advertising department, a
fact which the Court acknowledges with no suggestion of disapproval.29 '
Moreover, in a larger sense, the case itself stands more for the proposition that robust discussion of public issues will result from unfettered
criticism by the press than that the press should be required to publish
in accordance with conventional concepts of fairness and balance.
Associated Press v. United States established that the first amendment does not protect predatory business practices in the press. But the
Court was also careful to establish that its decision did not mean that
publishers could be required initially to publish against their own judgment:
It is argued that the decree interferes with freedom "to print as
and how one's reason or one's interest dictates." The decree does not

compel AP or its members to permit publication of anything which
their "reason" tells them should not be published. It only provides that
after their "reason" has permitted publication of news, they shall not,
2"328 U.S. at 349-50.

2"See id. at 353, 356.
mNew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
2"Id. at 260-61.
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for their own financial advantage, unlawfully combine to limit its publication. 92
Red Lion is perhaps most readily distinguishable on the ground
that the fairness doctrine and accompanying regulations which the
Court upheld were occasioned in the first place by the need to license
broadcasters. As previously noted, broadcast regulation is most frequently justified on the basis of spectrum scarcity, a condition which
traditionally has been thought to have no parallel in the print media.
That was the explicit judgment of the Court in Red Lion, in which the
Court actually declined to consider other grounds for regulation. 93 The
argument has been made, of course, that the traditional distinction
2 94
recognized between the broadcast and print media is largely specious.
I am inclined to agree, but abandonment of this distinction does not
mean that the print media must therefore be subject to regulation; it can
as well be said, as others have, that what is called for instead is an
295
abandonment of much of the present broadcast regulatory structure.
Meanwhile, so long as Red Lion is itself predicated on a theory of
unique scarcity, it has no ready application to the print media.
The Florida court does make persuasive use of statements in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,298 the most recent of the Supreme
Court decisions in the line of defamation cases begun by New York
Times. In Rosenbloom, the Supreme Court held that all statements
involving matters of general interest or concern are privileged against
an action for damages in defamation unless the statements are knowingly false. In an opinion announcing the Court's decision, Mr. Justice
Brennan had suggested that "[if] the States fear that private citizens will
not be able to respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of assuring their ability to respond, rather than
in stifling public discussion of matters of public concern. ' 297 And he had
added the following footnote:
Some States have adopted retraction statutes or right-of-reply statutes. . . . One writer, in arguing that the First Amendment itself
29326 U.S. at 20 n.18.
N3395 U.S. at 400-01, 401 n.28.
"'See Robinson, supra note 21, at 158-59; Note, Concepts of the BroadcastMedia Under the
First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal,supra note 21, at 104-05. But cf. Jaffe, supra
note 21, at 785.
"sSee, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 21, at 756-57. But cf. note 212 supra and accompanying text.
-5403 U.S. 29 (1971).
2
11d. at 47.
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should be read to guarantee a right of access to the media not limited

to a right to respond to defamatory falsehoods, has suggested several
ways the law might encourage public discussion. .

.

.It is important

to recognize that the private individual often desires press exposure
either for himself, his ideas, or his causes. Constitutional adjudication
must take into account the individual's interest in access to the press
as well as the individual's interest in preserving his reputation, even
though libel actions by their nature encourage a narrow view of the
individual's interest since they focus only on situations where the individual has been harmed by undesired press attention. A constitutional
rule that deters the press from covering the ideas or activities of the
private individual thus conceives the individual's interest too nar2 8
rowly.

While these statements alone might be read as supporting the Florida
statute, in Rosenbloom they take on a more restricted meaning.
Rosenbloom was notable chiefly because it finally made clear that the
privilege in New York Times applied not only to defamatory statements
concerning "public officials" or "public figures" but to otherwise private individuals whose activities were a matter of public concern as well.
This extension was significant in part because it tended to undercut one
of the grounds on which the earlier cases had seemed to rest. New York
Times had involved public officials of whom it was later said in passing
that their position might enable them to rebut defamatory statements
more readily than could private individuals. 9 Similar reasoning was
present in the Butts and Walker-30 cases which extended the New York
Times privilege to statements concerning public figures whose position
in life either invited public attention or whose purposeful activities had
thrust them into the vortex of a public controversy.30 The ability to
command a forum for reply, however, was by no means the principal
underpinning for the Times privilege. Indeed, well before Rosenbloom,
it had become all but certain that the privilege was intended primarily
to encourage "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" discussion of public
issues-no matter who might be involved. Numerous state and lower
federal courts had so interpreted the New York Times rule,"' and the
nld.at 47 n. 15.
2'See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967).
"Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
301d. at 154-55 (Harlan, J.).
"4'E.g., Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 573 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922

(1969) ("We conclude that the constitutional privilege extends to discussions by specific individuals,
not associated with government, if those individuals are involved in matters of important public
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Supreme Court itself had seemed to say as much in Time, Inc. v. Hill
in the context of a privacy action. 3 Still, it was possible to offer the

"ability to command access to a forum" argument in Rosenbloom because the Court had never quite foreclosed the question in a libel case.

The plaintiff made that argument in Rosenbloom and in response to this
argument Justice Brennan employed the language and footnote relied

on by the court in Tornillo. Against this background, Justice Brennan
was actually making two points, neither of which affords direct support
for the Florida statute. First, he apparently supposed that some retrac-

tion or reply statutes might be appropriate in the case of "defamatory
falsehoods." Narrowly limited, statutes of this sort presumably would

be no more objectionable than an award of damages and might, in some
cases, be more important to the injured plaintiff. 4 His second point,
although acknowledging the case for access "not limited. . . to defamatory falsehoods," does so, I think, in order to suggest that libel actions
themselves inhibit access to the press since they tend to discourage

vigorous coverage of public issues. Thus in response to the plaintiff's
argument against extending the Times privilege to private citizens, Jus-

tice Brennan observes that this position "conceives the individual's interest too narrowly."
While there is no precedent for Tornillo, there is also very little
authority squarely opposed to it. Reply statutes of the Florida variety

are few in number and have remained virtually untested by the courts
on first amendment grounds.305 An exception is found, however, in
concern."); Garfinkel v. Twenty-First Century Publishing Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 787, 291 N.Y.S.2d
735, 737 (1968) (per curiam) (summary disposition of complaint warranted where accused publication involved "matters of general public interest").
'See 385 U.S. at 379, 387-88.
31Draftsmanship presents the principal difficulty with reply statutes in a defamation context.
They must be neither vague nor overbroad, and they should not require a reply until there has been
a finding of liability. Practically, therefore, they may not always be valuable to the plaintiff. The
reply may not appear until the defamatory publication has already escaped effective rebuttal. A
reply may also simply review and aggravate the original injury to reputation. Still, an argument
can reasonably be made that a right of reply ought to be available as an additional or optional
remedy in a case of defamation. See generally Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to
an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867 (1948); Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public
Official, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1730 (1967). These were the two articles cited by Justice Brennan in
his footnote in the Rosenbloom case, 403 U.S. at 47 n.15.
"0See Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, supra note 304, at 1746 n.104.
At present, there appears to be no operative "equal space" statute except for the Florida provision.
A former Nevada statute was repealed in 1969 by legislation which now provides only for retractions of defamatory publications. Act of April 14, 1969, ch. 310, [1969] Laws of Nevada 553;
repealing NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.570 (1963). A Mississippi statute has been limited by judicial

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

6 an advisory opinion of the Massachusetts
Opinion of the Justices,"'

Supreme Judicial Court delivered five days pribr to the decision in
Tornillo. In its Opinion, the Massachusetts court considers the constitu-

tionality of a proposed statute creating a limited right of access to print
media which publish paid political advertising. Under the statute, the
publishers also would be obliged to carry advertisements expressing
contrary views."' In a brief discussion, the court holds that the statute
would violate the first amendment in its application to the print
media." 8 Observing that the proposed bill "may produce the chilling
effect of discouraging newspapers . . .from accepting any political
construction to require replies only to defamatory comment on the "honesty or integrity or moral
character of the candidate .. " Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 630, 63 So. 2d 91, 96 (1953)
(construing § 3175 of the Mississippi Code of 1942, ch. 19, § 12B, [19351 Miss. Laws 43 (now
Miss. STAT. ANN. § 23-3-35 (1972)). Of course, this construction would be still further limited by
the New York Times line of cases.
298 N.E.2d 829 (1973).
3
Mass. _
0Mass. House No. 3460, submitted to the Justices by the Massachusetts Senate on May I1,
1973, would provide:
SECTION 1. Chapter 56 of the General Laws is hereby amended by inserting
after section 39 the following two sections:
"Section 39A. If the owner, editor, publisher or agent of a newspaper or other
periodical of general circulation publishes any paid political advertisement designed or
tending to aid, injure or defeat any candidate for public or political office or any position
with respect to a question to be submitted to the voters, he shall not refuse to publish
any paid political advertisement tending to aid, injure or defeat any other candidate for
the same public or political office or any other position with respect to the same question
to be submitted to the voters in the primary or election unless such publication would
violate section forty-two or any other provision of this chapter.
"Whoever refuses to comply with this section may be ordered to comply therewith
in a suit in equity commenced by any aggrieved candidate or other person or persons
and shall forfeit to him or them not less than one hundred dollars. The court may award
such additional damages as it may deem proper, together with costs of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
"Section 39B. The owner, editor, publisher or agent of a newspaper or other
periodical of general circulation shall not charge for the publication of any paid political
advertisement an amount greater than the local display rate charged for a paid nonpolitical advertisement offered under similar circumstances and of comparable size, complexity, and location in the same edition or issue of such newspaper or periodical.
"A candidate or other person or persons aggrieved by a violation of this section
may recover treble the differential between the amount charged and the amount that
should have been charged, plus court costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee."
, 298 N.E.2d at 831-35. The court had also held that an earlier draft
30
Mass. at
of § 39A would be unconstitutional, but on the grounds of "impermissible vagueness." Opinion
284 N.E.2d 919, 921 (1972), 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 711 (1973).
of the Justices, - Mass. In its present Opinion, the Court notes that "[ihe proposed legislation now considered by us
Mass. at -,
remedies almost all of the difficulties which were found in the previous bill." 298 N.E.2d at 831.
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advertisements, '

319

the court adds:

The situation at which § 39A is directed may be the "monopolistic" status of certain news publications. However, compulsion to publish all responsive political advertisements, applicable to all newspapers and other publications of general circulation in the Commonwealth, goes beyond what is essential to the furtherance of any interest
of a State in its citizens having a right of access to newspapers in order
to express, at their expense, political ideas which otherwise would not
be published. .

.

. Indeed, no set of circumstances may exist which

would support a legislative mandate that a newspaper or other publication of general circulation must publish a political advertisement.,
Democratic National Committee also strongly indicates that the Supreme Court would not accept legislation of the sort presented in
Tornillo. This conclusion is implicit in the views expressed by the Chief
Justice 3t l and is entirely consistent with the position taken by Justices
Douglas and Stewart in their separate opinions. Justice Brennan is fairly
explicit in his views concerning regulation of the print media:
The decision as to who shall operate newspapers is made in the free
market, not by Government fiat. The newspaper industry is not extensively regulated and, indeed, in light of the differences between the
would violate the First
electronic and printed media, such regulation
3 12
Amendment with respect to newspapers.

Professor Emerson, although critical of a comprehensive right of
access to newspapers, his suggested that reply statutes and ,even a
broader obligation to print all editorial advertisements might conveniently be enforced without substantial adverse impact. 13 The adminis298 N.E.2d at 834.
... _ Mass. at _,
at 834-35.
N.E.2d
298
31id. at 31

The Chief Justice, joined by both Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, observes in dictum: "The
power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political, social and economic view is
bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence
advertisers-to assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and
publishers." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2094 (1973).
' 11d. at 2126 n.12.
"IT.EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 669-71 (1970). In practice, many
newspapers make effective provision for replies, either as a matter of journalistic ethics or even
more formally. Probably few journalists would be prepared, however, to accept their own reply
procedures as legal obligations. See Daniel, supra note 21, at 789-90. Professor Chafee considered
reply statutes at length, but concluded that they were probably unwise:
In spite of what has been said about the possible desirability of the compulsory right
of reply, it is my opinion that the chief cure for falsehoods in mass communications
should be sought outside the realm of law. Reckless misstatements in a particular
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trative burdens probably would not be insurmountable. But the question
of adverse effect is another matter. Reply statutes' do present a substan-

tial threat of the "chilling effect" which concerned the Massachusetts
Justices. Newspapers simply may be less ready to cover election campaigns or public issues if they must provide free space for all replies.u
While the effect probably would be felt more keenly by small publishers,
even major daily papers literally cannot afford to provide free space for

all the readers' contributions that they may receive. 1
Obviously the more limited the scope of the right to reply, the more
limited will be the likely impact of the right. But this is at best a weak
proposition of degree which still leaves substantial room for undesirable
results. The publisher of a four-page, single-fold weekly in some rural
section of Florida, for example, may find little comfort in the relatively
limited scope of the Florida statute if, in exchange for editorial opinion
on the candidacies of a dozen would-be local school board members, he
must allow perhaps one-fourth or even one-eight of a week's space for
their replies. Multiply the drain on his space by another half dozen
elections of local interest, and he may sacrifice as much as a week's
production in every year. In these circumstances,he may easily persuade
himself to cover the Loyal Bercans' potluck supper and let the candinewspaper are not isolated events in its life. They are an expression of the soul of that
newspaper. Occasional attacks on a few falsehoods here and there, by libel suits or by
new legal remedies, may accomplish a little, but they will not get the kind of newspaper
it needs so long as irresponsibility prevails to a substantial extent among editors and
owners. And law cannot reach what is inside human beings. The community must
proceed on a broader front and with other weapons. Somehow the community must
make the newspaper want to be better. If this task be hopeless, then a way must be found
to get another and better newspaper started.
I Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 195 (1947). See generally id. at 145-95.
"'Former New York Times Managing Editor Clifton Daniel has estimated that if the Times
had printed all of the publishable letters received in 1969, "they would have filled up at least 135
complete weekday issues.
... Daniel, supra note 21, at 785.
Every day of the year The New York Times receives an average of one million, three
hundred thousand words of news material. At best, a tenth of it can be printed. A highly
skilled, high-speed process of selection is involved-a massive act of discrimination, if
you like-discrimination between the relevant and the irrelevant, the important and the
unimportant. Actually, 168 bushels of wastepaper, most of it rejected news, are collected
and thrown away every day in the editorial departments of The New York Times.
Id. at 785-86.
35
Indeed, considerations like these led the Florida Chapter of the ACLU to argue in Tornillo
that the Florida statute is violative of due process as a taking of property without payment of just
compensation. See Brief for Florida ACLU as Amicus Curiae at 27-36. The Florida Court holds,
however, that the statute "is a valid exercise of the state police power to assure the integrity of the
electoral process." Tornillo opinion 1I.
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dates go hang. Nor is it obvious that the major daily newspaper will
escape the pinch. Many metropolitan papers attempt to provide a comprehensive editorial review of candidates for state-wide elections. The
review may involve dozens or even scores of candidates and may fill
several editorial pages over a period of days. If an equal number of
pages must then be set aside f'or free replies, even the largest paper may
be tempted to forego or curtail at least some of its customary coverage.
While the facts in Tornillo do not present quite the problems just
discussed, they do suggest another source of concern for the "chilling
effect." The Florida statute is intended partly to prevent unfairness to
the candidate who is singled out for attack. But it promotes another
kind of unfairness. The candidate who is first attacked and then replies
gets a kind of double bonus: the net effect of the exchange may be to
cancel whatever persuasive effect either the editorial or the reply might
independently have had; but the candidate still gets two exposures. In
turn, the double exposures can provide an edge in terms of voter recognition. Sophisticated editors will readily understand this possibility and
may decide, on balance, to withhold at least marginal comment in order
to avoid exaggerating the appeal of an otherwise little-known candidate.
These problems are not at all exhaustive, but they illustrate some
very practical adverse effects of even limited reply statutes. As the
effects multiply, so will the pressures to "correct" them. An obligation
to print paid editorial advertisements upon demand might seem a desirable alternative, but even.it would not escape serious practical objections. For example, as Chief Justice Burger observes in Democratic
National Committee, a right of access begun through paid advertising
would either simply favor the wealthy or require further efforts at control in order to strike a balance. 311 In short, Professor Emerson's response to these alternatives seems too easy. The real problem with them
is that they cannot be enough. Recognition of the claims to access
represented in these proposals will inevitably lead to enlarged claims
until, in time, we can expect a comprehensive, controlled right of access
to the press at large. This will require, of course, a corresponding redefinition of the first amendment, but that will present no insurmountable
obstacle either, so long as the first steps have been taken. The difficulty
with the first amendment is that there are no real second lines of defense. And the result has been summarized in two sentences by Professor Emerson himself:
"'93 S. Ct. at 2096-97.
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A limited right of access to the press can be safely enforced. But any
effort to solve the broader problems of a monopoly press by forcing
newspapers to cover all "newsworthy" events and print all viewpoints,
under the watchful eyes of petty public officials, is likely to undermine
as the press now shows without achieving any real
such independence
3 17
diversity.
One cannot make these points without experiencing a sense of deja vu.
Certainly they have been made before.3 18 Yet so long as they are not
self-evident-so long, indeed, as access is at the cross-roads-one can
feel an obligation to continue the debate in terms which may suggest
again why the fundamental first amendment reorientation implicit in
Tornillo ought not go unchallenged.
IV.

ACCESS TO THE MASS MEDIA:

A DISSENTING ASSESSMENT

A "right" of access to the mass media can obviously exist in meaningful terms only if some provision is made for its enforcement. The
access proponents have suggested three principal means by which an
affirmative right might be implemented. The first is legislation; a second
is some form of administrative oversight-patterned, perhaps, after the
FCC's administration of the fairness doctrine; the third is access enforced by the courts. Probably all three will have a role to play if a
comprehensive access doctrine is developed. A limited statutory right of
access to the print media has been upheld in Tornillo; if that decision
stands, additional legislation may appear in other states and, perhaps,
in Congress as well. The courts, of course, can expect to be drawn into
the development of an access doctrine to resol e disputes arising under
the legislation. Indeed, unless the Supreme Court issues an opinion far
more definitive than any it has yet handed down, the courts can also
expect continued efforts to establish a right of access based on state
action. Moreover, since neither courts nor legislatures are well suited
to the task of administering access on a continuing basis, administrative
51

3 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESsION 671 (1970).

"'Professor Chafee, who wrote with greater evidence of real understanding of the media than
have many commentators since, believed that increasing professionalism and a resulting sense of
moral obligation would be preferable and more workable than laws intended to impose a public
service obligation. While he would allow some room for FCC regulation of broadcasting, he
resisted broader legislation on these grounds: first, that there is really no place to draw the line;
second, that laws intended to produce impartiality cannot be drawn clearly enough to be workable
in practice; and, third, that "liberty of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel

what is to go into a newspaper." 2 Z. CHAFEE,

GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATION

(1947). See generally id. at 624-50. See also authorities cited note 21 supra.
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agencies will almost certainly be drawn into the role of immediate umpire.319 For these reasons, and because the objectionable aspects of a
comprehensive access doctrine are not substantially affected by questions of jurisdiction, I shall not bother to draw distinctions among the
three main avenues of enforcement.
Something needs to be said at this point, however, about the distinctions which might be drawn among the media. The commentators
who have resisted the access proposals at length have done so primarily
in the context of specific media, particularly the broadcast media. This
relatively narrow focus has had some advantages; a specific focus makes
it convenient to offer equally specific objections which may well carry
greater force than would more general observations. Yet specific objections can tend to obscure still larger and more sweeping objections,
either because they are not identified or because, although identified,
they do not lend themselves to extended articulation in a specific context. In my opinion, the proposals for access are most objectionable on
grounds which are amplified as they cut across the established mass
media. The reasons why begin with a brief examination of the conceptual cost of the access doctrine.
A.

The Conceptual Cost

1. The question of suppression. It is surely unnecessary to describe in detail the access doctrine's most obvious cost: the possibility
that the state may exercise its power to deny enforcement in some
particular case. In conceptual terms the power to enforce also necessarily imports the power to withhold enforcement. Thus an obvious but
nonetheless necessary cost of the access doctrine is that the state must
acquire new powers not only to require particular publications but also
to suppress them. This conceptual reality is not lessened by arguments
which point to instances of suppression in the traditional private editorial process. Private suppression unquestionably exists; the very essence of the editorial function obviously is to decide what shall be published. But to acknowledge this fact is not to diminish the larger reality:
"'In Democratic National Committee, Chief Justice Burger suggested that a right of access
would require oversight of "far more of the day-to-day operations of broadcasters' conduct..."
93 S. Ct. at 2098. The statement is not an exaggeration. Indeed, the equal time and fairness
provisions, which are no more complex than would be required under a controlled right of access,
have nevertheless required the intervention of the FCC staff into determinations of broadcast
content quite literally on a day-to-day basis. See Wall Street Journal, Oct. 2, 1972, at 34, cols. 1-

6.
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all power to affect the content of the press is of necessity the power to
320
suppress as well as to publish.
The question remains, however, whether it is conceptually worse
for the state to exercise editorial powers than for private individuals so
to do. To Professor Jaffe the answer is clear:
The proposition that the threat of government censorship is much less
than that of private censorship cannot withstand the lesson of the
government's attempt to suppress publication of the Pentagon Papers.

An argument of this sort can only be made by one who, not having
lived under a system of government censorship, appears to have no
idea what it really means. If one private person suppresses a fact there
are others who may publish. Not so if the government forbids !311
It is true, of course, that one whose demand for access is denied suffers
somethng in comparison with those whose demands are granted. It is
not quite so clear, however, that the particular loss is necessarily greater
at the hands of the state than at the hands of private editors. Professor
Jaffe appears to assume that a state denial of access precludes publication elsewhere in a way that private denial would not. Yet it is entirely
possible for the state to deny access to a particular publication in a
particular medium at a particular time without precluding publication
elsewhere or at some other time. In that case, the immediate loss would
be precisely the same as in cases in which private editors refuse publication.
Professor Jaffe may mean only that the precedents established by
state denials of access in particular circumstances will lead inevitably
toward more sweeping rejections of proposed publications. I think that
will indeed be the case. But it will result from considerations beyond the
conceptual requirments of the access proposals. Insofar as occasional
denials of particular access are concerned, there is no clearly greater
danger in state regulation than in the traditional private editorial process. In either case, if one is denied access to The New York Times or
the NBC network, one is still free to seek other outlets or to come back
later.
Yet concern for the potential suppressive power of the state is not
wholly beside the point. The real conceptual cost of a comprehensive
right of access lies not in the potential for suppression, but rather in the
limitations which must be imposed upon the state in order to control

that potential.
3

'0See Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, supra note 21, at 636.
3ZJaffe, supra note 21, at 786.
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2. The limitations of the golden mean. The access proponents
have not been unconcerned with the problems posed by state intercession in behalf of access. Their concern, however, has been directed
mainly toward the immediate problems posed by the questions of suppression. Their response has been to call for a system of balances which
will prevent arbitrary action by the state. Thus, for example, Professor
Barron has written:
No illusions are entertained about government as compared with private power. The need is to build counter-balances into each sector to
stimulate them to develop a responsiveness to2 the longing for an information process which is truly participatory.1
What is wanted, in other words, is a kind of "golden mean"-a mechanism for assuring that state enforcement of the access doctrine will be
administered in a non-discriminatory manner, with objectivity and balance.
This is not only what the access proponents want; it is almost
certainly what they must have. As I have suggested, a limited right of
access may be required, as a matter of substantive first amendment
doctrine, to operate under rules or regulatons intended to achieve a
balance in the resulting ideological spectrum. This seems implicit in the
reasoning of the five Justices in Democratic National Committee, and
it is consistent with the state's general obligation not to dominate the
content of the press that it regulates. Even if balance is not required as
constitutional doctrine, however, it is virtually unavoidable as a political
proposition. A moment's reflection will suggest that if an access doctrine is developed because of concern for bias in the media, it will
scarcely be satisfactory if it does no more than perpetuate that bias or
establish another. In short, if the state is to play a role in enforcing
access, then it must surely do so under an accompanying obligation to
seek some balance in the process.
To be sure, that obligation arises clearly only when the state involves itself in the process of content selection. Common carrier regulation, for example, presumably would not require the establishment of
balanced content. But few of the access proponents have seriously proposed a "first-come, first-served" system for access, 323 and with good
32Barron, An Emerging FirstAmendment Right of Access to the Media?, supra note 5, at

509.

3

23Former Federal Commications Commissioner Nicholas Johnson is most frequently identified with proposals for a first-come, first-served system. He has advocated as much in his dissents
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reason. Unless the system were administered under comprehensive rate
regulation, it would amount to little more than a series of microcosmic
laissez-faire market-places.12 As both the Chief Justice and Judge
Wright recognized,325 an access doctrine based solely on the ability to
pay the going rate would provide access most often to those who can
afford it. That might be constitutionally defensible in a common carrier
system, 36 but politically it would be most unattractive and would obviate most of the gains the access proponents seek. Yet rate regulation-or even free time-would not resolve the difficulties inherent in a
common carrier concept of access. 327 What works well enough with the
telephone and telegraph would by no means be satisfactory in the mass
media. The established media simply cannot guarantee simultaneous
time or space to everyone who may wish to speak or write at the same
time, and a randomly ordered "waiting list" would scarcely lend itself
to effective timely discussion of public issues.32 For very practical
reasons, then, most proposals for access assume a limited right under
which individual claims to access must be weighed against other competing claims, and with that sort of limited right of access, objectivity
and balance are required for the reasons we have seen.
Yet if objectivity and balance are the necessary concomitants of the
access doctrine, they are also its real, if subtle, conceptual costs. They
are costs, in a perfectly conventional sense of the term, because they
limit what is possible. The private press is free to establish its content
according to whatever judgments, good or bad, suggest themselves from
time to time; the state is not. What the state must do instead is avoid
serving any judgment which does not essentially contribute toward the
establishment of a balance. The result in the latter case is a press that
may have less capacity to do harm. It will also have less capacity to do
good. These are the necessary limitations of the golden mean. Of course,
this observation is not new. It is implicit in much of what is said by the
Justices (including those in dissent) in DemocraticNational Committee,
in Commission proceedings, Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 234-35 (1970), and, in
more muted form, in law review commentary. See Johnson & Westen, supra note 5, at 627-29,
628 n.235.
"'Cf.Botein, supra note 4, at 440.

32"CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2096-97 (1973) (Burger, C.J.); Business
Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J.).
3
'But see Marks, supra note 21, at 981-82.

3'See Jaffe, supra note 21, at 787-89. Professor Jaffe is persuasively critical of proposals for
rate regulation.
3"See Marks, supra note 21, at 981-82; 85 HARV. L. REv. 689, 697 (1972).
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and it is clearly what Madison had in mind in his memorandum to the
French Ambassador that explained why the American press was not
more closely confined:
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything,

and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press. It has
accordingly been decided by the practice of the States, that it is better

to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than,
by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper
fruits."'
Still, conceptual analysis has its own limitations. One may rationally choose to pay a conceptual price in exchange for apparent improvements in one's practical circumstances. The ultimate question, then, is
whether the developing access doctrine offers that exchange.
B.

The Promise and the Reality: A PragmaticAnalysis.

The twin promises of the access doctrine are increased opportunities for the effective expression of diverse opinion and thus more "robust, wide-open" debate in "the media of greatest impact." Reality, I
think, promises something quite different. It has been suggested that
access will not bring about greater diversity.33 I think that is a fair
assessment of the prospects in any given medium. But the problem goes
beyond that when it is considered in terms of all the media. A controlled
right of access to the press at large means not only no substantial gain
in diversity, but also the distinct possibility of a new consolidation of
American orthodoxy in which balanced mainstream thinking will come
to dominate the press even more so than at present while serious dissent
will be, in relative terms, even more surely suppressed.
1. Robust debate and a balanced diversity. In the first place, the
new diversity offers no real prospect of a robust debate. On the contrary,
what is offered is a managed debate in the context of a balanced diversity. The reason why is suggested by the majority's basic assumption in
DemocraticNational Committee: careful steps must be taken to ensure,
in effect, that no side of the debate begins to gain dominance. If one
side does begin to dominate, another must be promoted (and the first
therefore either diluted or suppressed) in order to achieve the balance
that is the price of state intervention in the process. It is in this respect
32

1 Quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717-18 (1931).
-"See,e.g., Robinson, supra note 21, at 161-62.
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that the conceptual limitations of the access doctrine will first ripen into
practical reality.
The immediate practical consequence is not altogether clear. In his
opinion, Judge Wright spoke of the need for "reasonable regulations"
(whatever that means); 331 law review commentary is filled with individual suggestions for implementing access. Consider the following proposal, for example:
It is by the judicial process that we shall establish the contours for
answers to questions which a working right of access obviously presents. What is a minority point of view? When and where shall such
opinions be heard? Has some significant space already been given to a
particular controversy? Isn't it possible to reach saturation of a given
subject? When is the decision not to publish on a particular issue a
"news" decision and when is it a decision based upon an effort to
obstruct the opinion process? Surely resolving these problems is no less
baffling than deciding when a book is "without redeeming social importance" or when it is marketed against a "background of commercial exploitation." But which task accommodates itself more easily to
the basic theory of the first amendment? A task which winnows out
that which is to be suppressed, or a task whose point of inquiry is
whether the communications media have been in32 default and whether
a particular point of view has been suppressed?
One may doubt in passing whether the final rhetorical questions in the
quoted passage resolve themselves in the way their author supposes. But
that is not the point. The point is that the "contours" of the access
doctrine will almost surely develop very much as this proposal suggests.
These questions and others like them will have to be considered and
resolved if the state, in its efforts to enforce access, is not also to undo
the ideological balance in the press.
1'Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971):
[I]nvalidation of a flat ban on editorial advertising does not close the door to "reasonable regulations" designed to prevent domination by a few groups on a few viewpoints.
Within a general regime of accepting some editorial advertisements, there is room for
the Commission and licensees to develop such guidelines. For example, there could be
some outside limits on the amount of advertising time that will be sold to one group or
to representatives of one particular narrow viewpoint. The licensee should not begin to

exercise the same "authoritative selection" in editorial advertising which he exercises in
normal programming. . . . However, we are confident of the Commission's ability to
set down guidelines which avoid that danger.
Id. at 664 (emphasis in original).
"2Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, supra note 5, at
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Meanwhile, the larger outlines are reasonably clear. As statutes are
enacted, regulations implemented and precedents established, the day of
the clear editorial stand will have largely passed 3 3 I suppose it requires a kind of ontological faith to lament its passing. It may require
a certain naivete as well, inasmuch as the press has not always taken
clear stands on even the most vital issues. And yet I suspect-unaided
by the elaborate content analyses and retrospective polls it would require to prove the point-that we do owe something to the capacity of
the press to change its posture from indifference to commitment when
moved to do so. The course of the civil rights movement and the war in
Viet Nam might have been settled in the streets alone; I could be persuaded, however, that attitudes reflected in the press have contributed
something toward their resolution. If that is so, the contributions-whether viewed as good or bad-have not been the product of
the kind of balance a "working right of access" will require.
Access enforced by the state almost surely means the loss of what
Professor William Canby has recently termed "the right to persuade. '334 In an article which identifies the problem but, I think, fails
to appreciate the reasons why it is inherent in a "right" of access, he
argues that some provision ought to be made to allow individual arguments to prevail when they are meritorious-that is, when they gain a
substantial number of adherents. 3 His concern is well-placed; it is not
at all clear why we should want the media converted into sterile academics of balanced debate. The difficulty is that we cannot have things both
ways: we cannot, in other words, expect to establish a system in which
the state is asked to restore a lost "equilibrium" and, at the same time,
to allow the more appealing arguments to prevail.
In the search for balance, another phenonemon will also be at
work. Since it is not possible for the media to accommodate everyone
who may care to speak concerning a given issue at the same time, it will
frequently be necessary to search for representative points of view rather
than distinctly individual arguments. Indeed, this is routinely assumed
by most of the access proponents. 3 The difficulty here, however, is
mSee Blake, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: Fairness and the Emperor's New Clothes,
supra note 21, at 91.
3'Canby, supra note 5.

3"See id. at 754-57; cf., Note, The Public Interest in Balanced Programming Content: The
Case for FCC Regulation of Broadcaster'sFormatChanges, supra note 5, at 955-56, in which the
author offers "a theory of proportional representation, whereby significant blocs of listeners are
entitled to proportionately significant blocs of programming." Id. at 956.
3'"lt is self-evident that a system which contemplates personal access on demand is impossi-

NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 52

that representative points of view tend in themselves to strike a balance
between the extreme edges of the spectrum of opinion that they represent. 317 Thus the larger balance which is inherent in the access doctrine
will be complemented and reinforced by a further balance in the very
opinions that are offered.
The result of all of this will be debate only in the most pointless
and distasteful sense of the term: arid, dull and, on the whole, unpersuasive 3s Mill's contentions concerning the nature of effective discourse
come to mind. Debate is meaningful, he argued, only when it is conducted passionately, without restraint, by those who advocate points of
view which are themselves passionately held. Otherwise, the effect resembles learning by lecture: opinion is abstractly received and held,
untested, and may interfere with real capacity for understanding:
[E]ven if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth;
unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly
contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner
of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational
grounds. And not only this. . . the meaning of the doctrine itself will
be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect
on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal
profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason
or personal experience.39
ble. There must always be some guidelines that determine who shall speak. It is the exchange of
ideas which is the goal." Note, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, supra note 5,
at 1043 n.973.
"'This is one of the objections which Justice Brennan offers to the fairness doctrine. See
CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2130 (1973) (dissenting opinion). While his
objection is valid, the access doctrine offers no improvement. A representative balance is the
unhappy accompaniment to any extensive government effort to satisfy competing claims to speech.
33
1 Professor Kalven has responded in part to the argument for fair debate this way:
[I]t misconceives the utility of bias in public discussion. Public discussion is all a sort of
adversary process on a grand scale, kept alive by the lively and firm expression of
opinions. The Supreme Court has. . . recognized the point in the New York Times case
when it speaks of the commitment to discussion on public issues that is "uninhibited,
robust, and wide open." It is most unlikely that public discussion will have that muscle
tone if each publisher must worry about being fair to both sides.
Kalven, supra note 21, at 47.
'J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 46-47 (McCallum ed. 1947). Of course, Mill can be cited from

more than one perspective. Professor Barron suggests that Mill was moved more by fear of power
than by fear of government and can therefore be read in support of the arguments for access. See
J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? 81-85 (1973). But one can ask whether Mill would
have thought the access doctrine, as it actually seems likely to develop, a worthwhile exchange.
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One need not look far to find contemporary support for these
observations.341 The lifeless quality of mannered debate is readily apparent when one considers the fairness doctrine and the "robust" debate
which it has engendered. Surely no one who has heard or seen the typical
broadcast editorial or the typical "responsible" reply can fail to sense
something of the futility in argument-according-to-format-argument
endlessly in check in a game which admits no mate. There are exceptions, undoubtedly. Yet in the main, I think, robust debate and a balanced diversity are inherently at odds.
2. The new centrism. One might accept a certain loss in vigor,
however, if balanced debate could be relied on to expose a truly wideopen spectrum of opinion. If the inherent centrism of the mass media
were merely altered so that genuinely divergent opinion were exposed
with some regularity, one could see a gain. However sterile the debate
in the media, the mass audience might at least be encouraged to engage
in robust debate in other, less constrained circumstances.
Practically, however, there seems little likelihood that access will
bring wide-open discussion. What seems likely instead-if not certain-is simply the establishment of a new and expanded centrism.
What seems equally likely is that the new centrism will be gained only
at the cost of a relatively greater degree of suppression of serious dissent.
That the present media are primarily centrist in their orientation
is, I take it, commonly accepted. There are fairly clear reasons why. In
the first place, the desire to appeal to a mass audience fairly assures
content aimed at common denominators, content which will attract
more than it repels. There are additional reasons. The ethics and practice of mass journalism-a journalism which prizes the appearance of
objectivity in a practice which reflects what Sander Vanocur calls the
"rat pack" psychology of what is important-tend rather clearly to
reflect the middle ground, the common causes and the conventional
wisdom.34' The background of the media proprietors provides a further
impetus toward centrist points of view. There is little reason, after all,
to expect those who operate the media to invest consistently in attacks
upon the system which supports them.
"'The Supreme Court acknowedged Mills' argument when it upheld the reply provisions of
the fairness doctrine. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 n.18 (1969).
3"Conversation with Sander Vanocur, August 7, 1973, Duke University. Durham, North

Carolina.
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There is also little reason to doubt that the access doctrine will tend
somewhat to broaden the present spectrum of opinion in the media.
Once an initial right of access is established, courts and other administrators should not find it particularly troublesome to enforce the right
in cases which offer no more than another side to an established debate.
Publishers and broadcasters who fail to sense the particular interests of
their audience at a point in time will find the audience able, as it were,
to serve itself. I think it fair to speculate, however, that in all but the
exceptional case, the broadened spectrum will remain decidedly conventional in its expression and only slightly less so in its substance. Certainly that has been the experience to date in the cases which have
considered access. Labor issues; discrimination in the placement of
Negro wedding announcements; blue-pencilled movie advertisements;
Democratic Party opposition to the Republicans; conventional opposition to the Viet Nam War-these and similar expressions of dissent
have formed the substance of the proposals for access. No one could
deny that they are issues which deserve to be raised in the press. But it
would require a narrow view of the ideological spectrum to suggest that
they are anything but establishmentarian in their range. If all of these
proposals to publish had been resolved in favor of their proponents, the
range of thought represented in the press might have been widened by
a notch or so, but surely little more.
A tendency toward the mainstream is also suggested by the rather
obvious economic implications of access. As they are most often advanced, the proposals begin with the notion that those who will gain
initial admission to the media will be those who can afford to pay the
going rate for advertising. Yet, as we have seen, the proposals cannot
stop there. In practical, political terms, the doctrine must be broad
enough to provide for at least some "right to respond" independent of
ability to pay. It is at this point, however, that economic consideratons
begin to confine the scope of what can be said. So long as a portion of
the incremental costs of access must be absorbed by the media
proprietors, the proprietors will have understandable reasons for resisting an unlimited scope of debate. That has been our experience with the
fairness doctrine, and it ignores economic realities to suppose that these
same pressures will not also shape the access doctrine.
Meanwhile, even as the mainstream is slightly widened and reinforced, non-mainstream thinking will still be apt to find itself excluded-the more so as its subtance and expression depart from what
is conventional. The apparent grounds for exclusion will have little initial relationship to the access doctrine. Instead, relying on definitions
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of obscenity, speech-action relationships, the clear and present danger
test, interest balancing-even in some cases, general canons of "good
taste" and "suitability for general audiences" 34 2-courts and administrators can be expected to reject a fairly distinct category of potential
publications. The rejections will not normally be addressed to the more
abstract ideas but rather to their particular expression. For serious
dissent, however, that will represent a very real form of suppression.
The New Left and related movements offer an instructive model.
While they are undeniably rooted in ideology, it is nearly impossible to
separate the ideology from rather particular forms of expression. There
is scarcely any satisfactory translation of "fuck the draft"; obscene and
indecent expression are part and parcel of the contempt for conventional
society which adherents to these movements seek to convey. Yet the
form of the expression, and thus the ideology itself, are of precisely the
sort which we can expect to be excluded from the mass media whether
a right of access is established or not. 43
342
See Marks, supra note 21, at 994-97. See generally Note, Morality and the Broadcast
A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, supra note 5.
Media:
3 3
" Consider, for example, the FCC's action in the case of WUHY-FM, Eastern Education
Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970). The licensee aired a taped interview with Jerry Garcia, leader of
the rock group "The Grateful Dead." The interview was offered as part of an "underground"
program intended to reach "youthful persons" in the Philadelphia area. Garcia discussed a number
of subjects which, as the Commission was to point out in its subsequent opinion, might have been
expressed in conventional terms: ecology, politics and music, to suggest a few. His language,
however, was peppered with obscenities, primarily the words "fuck" and "shit." The Commission,
with two members in dissent, reviewed the circumstances surrounding the broadcast, determined
that the licensee had violated the public interest in permitting the broadcast of "indecent" matter,
and imposed a "forfeiture"-that is, a cash penalty amounting to a fine. Id. at 415. The majority
opinion provides a fairly clear illustration of the ways in which unconventional expression may be
suppressed even as the principle of "robust, wide-open debate" is reaffirmed in ringing terms. A
broadcast licensee, the majority asserted, has the "right to present provocative or unpopular
programming which may offend some listeners." Id. at 410. But that right does not extend to
speech which "has no redeeming social value, and is patently offensive by contemporary community standards, with very serious consequences to the 'public interest in the larger and more
effective use of radio.'" Id. The obvious argument that Garcia's language is its own statement of
his point of view did not escape Commissioners Cox and Johnson in dissent. Not so with the
majority, however:
The licensee argues that the program was not indecent, because its basic subject matters
• . . "are obviously decent"; "the challenged language though not essential to the meaning of the program as a whole, reflected the personality and life style of Mr. Garcia";
and "the realistic portrayal of such an interview cannot be deemed 'indecent' because
the subject incidently used strong or salty language" . . . We disagree with this approach in the broadcast field. Were it followed, any newscaster or talk moderator could
intersperse his broadcast with this expressions, or indeed a disc jockey could speak of
listen to this mother
his records and related views with phrases like, "s--t, man ....
f----r", on the ground that his overall broadcast was clearly decent, and that this manner
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Indecency and obscenity are not, of course, the only grounds on
which unconventional expressions of dissent will be excluded from the
media. There are embedded in the law of the first amendment a number
of related devices for suppressing speech which is offensive or dangerous. Among these, I suggest that it is the speech-action test and its
conceptual predecessor, the clear and present danger test, which will be
drawn into most frequent use. Everyone knows, of course, how these
tests work in principle: speech is protected unless it has, in effect, the
present capability of inducing action which is itself prohibited. Thus, in
the classic example, there is no right to yell "fire" in a crowded theater,
not because the right to yell fire is denied, but because there is no right
to induce panic in a crowd. These elementary principles will find a ready
application in the present context. It is precisely at the point that genuinely revolutionary calls to arms offer the greatest prospect of immediate action that they will be suppressed. Black militants may be
heard-but not when what they propose to say is thought likely to bring
of presentation reflected the "personality and life style" of the speaker, who was only
"telling it like it is." The licensee itself notes that the language in question "was not
essential to the presentation of the subject matter. . ." but rather was" . . . essentially
gratuitous". We think that is the precise point here-namely, that the language is
"gratuitous"-i.e.; "unwarranted or [having] no reason for its existence" (Websters
Collegiate Dictionary, Fifth Ed., p. 435). There is no valid basis in these circumstances
for permitting its widespread use in the broadcast field ...
Id. at 413. The majority added:
We conclude this discussion as we began it. We propose no change from our commitment to promoting robust, wide-open debate. . . . Simply stated, our position-limited
to the facts of this case-is that such debate does not require that persons being interviewed or station employees on talk programs have the right to begin their speech with
"S--t, man ... ", or use "f ........ or "mother f-......"as gratuitous adjectives throughout
their speech.
Id. at 415.
Professor Barron is critical of the Commission's decision in WUHY, as he is of other commission actions enforcing morality, but seems to argue in effect that access will at least result in more
public and predictable suppression:
Enforcement of a right of access to broadcasting is not designed to broaden exposure
to the obscene, or to lessen it, for that matter. Access as a right is dependent to some
extent on the establishment of program content standards dealing with obscenity. The
paradox, therefore, is that a larger access is dependent on censorship, a minimal censorship to be sure, but nonetheless censorship. But the censorship must be one whose
standards are public, and whose criteria will be constitutional instead of submerged,
private, extra-constitutional and eccentric as are the censorship standards now in actual
use in American broadcasting.
J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? 287-88 (1973). If this is supposed to be an
advantageous development, perhaps one can be pardoned for concealing one's gratitude behind a
cough.
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new violence to the cities. White racists may speak and publish-but not
at the possible cost of still more violent reactions. Youthful extremists
may call for institutional reforms-but not for bombing of the
institutions. And so on. The list multiples itself readily, and in these
kinds of cases, I submit, it is not at all unlikely that the expressions will
be excluded.
But what has this to do with access? Is it not merely an illustration
of the conventional proposition that first amendment rights are not
absolute? That, after all, we are not to be taken literally when we speak
of "robust, uninhibited, and wide-open" debate? Would not those whose
points of view are excluded from the mass media still be free to go on
as they now do-seeking other methods of expression while occasionally
making such nuisances of themselves that they qualify as legitimate
"news"? In a sense, the answer to these questions is yes. In immediate
practical terms, a right of access will do little more than consolidate and
reinforce the inherent centrism of the mass media. It will be a "new
centrism," but only in the degree to which it is balanced and slightly
widened. In other ways, however, the realities of the access doctrine will
have a direct relatonship to the realities of a greater suppression of
dissent and the corresponding establishment of a new American orthodoxy.
3. The new American orthodoxy. This will come about, I suggest,
as a result of interaction between two sets of considerations. First, those
whose views continue to be suppressed will not in fact find themselves
in their accustomed position. In relative terms they will be worse off.
By definition, they will be fewer in number: only the seriously disaffected will remain outside the pale. As a result, they can be expected to
feel still more isolated, more threatened, and thus more desperate than
they do now. The implications of an increased sense of alienation among
radical dissidents are scarcely minor. In a prophetic "note to liberals,"
New Left activist Tom Hayden has warned that violent confrontations-"an absolute right to resistance"-become necessary "when the
democratic system is less than pure, when in fact it is corrupt. . .[and]
First Amendment rights are ineffective . . . ."I" Whether the demo-

cratic system is "corrupt" in some absolute sense is, of course, beside
the point; the question is how the system is perceived by those who feel
themselves affected by it. And the first effect of the new centrism which
the access doctrine promises will almost certainly be a sharpened sense
"IT.

HAYDEN, TRIAL

44 (1970).
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of institutonal corruption among those who remain outside the widened
mainstream. In effect, the access doctrine will mean they are no longer
merely pitted against an amorphous "establishment." They will be able
to contend with some justification that it is the government itself which
has set them apart.
At the same time, the occasions for suppression may actually increase as courts and administrators encounter new difficulties in measuring speech against action in the unaccustomed context of the mass
media. Traditionally, this kind of evaluation has taken place, in a sense,
after the fact, usually in the setting of a criminal prosecution.345 A right
of access poses the problem in a different setting. It will be necessary
to decide in advance what effect the proposed speech will have in circumstances not yet clearly developed. The decision will be complicated
by the fact that the speech will be intended not merely for a handful of
partisans but rather for an unseen and thus unpredictable audience at
large. The point involved here is a fine one, and necessarily tendentious,
but I do not think it wholly unwarranted to suggest that the new settings
in which these decisions will take place may lead to an enlarged body
of cases in which speech will be categorized, in effect, as undeserving of
first amendment protection." 6 In this sense, as I have said, Professor
Jaffe's concern for the suppressive effect of the access doctrine has real
substance.
It is an effect which will be heightened in direct relationship to the
impact of the media. If the media have merely the power to confirm
existing attitudes and to influence those which are unformed, the tendency of an access doctrine which can deliver no more than a new
consolidation of centrist points of view will be, nonetheless, to raise new
"E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1968); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937):
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). Professor Barron has observed that a right of access is
unlikely to develop "unless it is made very clear that. . .[the right] does not compel the broadcast
media to transmit all material submitted no matter how obscene or socially corrosive." J. BARRON,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? 288 (1973). On the other hand, he has concluded "reluc.
tantly" that there may have to be some "access for hate." Id. at 301. How these two positions are
to be reconciled from case to case is not made clear. A suggestion of a likely approach made in
the Georgetown Law Journalaffords little peace of mind as to results:
Clearly, groups attempting to sponsor an advertisement have an interest in seeing their

ideas reach the public. The public, as a consumer of ideas, has an interest in being
exposed to varying opinions. But the government has an interest in maintaining the
public peace and order. The potential disruption, real or imagined, resulting from an
editorial advertisement must be balanced against government's concurrent duty to protect the rights of all its citizens.
Note, Media and the FirstAmendment in a Free Society, supra note 5, at 888-89.
"'See text accompanying note 321 supra.
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barriers to the effective expression of dissident thought. Persons whose
minds are made up obviously do not make good listeners. The problem
increases as even greater powers of persuasion are ascribed to the media.
If the access proponents are correct in their assumptions concerning the
"media of greatest impact," the access doctrine may well establish the
outlines of a new orthodoxy. It will still be an orthodoxy of middlethinking, distinguishable in substance from what we now have only in
the degree to which it is broadened and more balanced. But it will
deserve the label orthodoxy, nonetheless, as it comes increasingly to
shape and hold attitudes and beliefs of the American people.
I would be unwilling to posit a result so dramatic if it were not for
the potential effect of a second set of considerations. Professor Jaffe has
dismissed the assumption that the American people can be manipulated
by the media as "maddening," an "hysterical overestimation of media
power and underestimation of the good sense of the American public. 34 7 In traditional circumstances I would agree. But traditional circumstances have implied a healthy skepticism toward the press, a skepticism engendered in no small part, I suspect, by the fundamental assumption that the press cannot be relied upon to be fair and balanced
in its content. There is probably no more satisfying evidence of a basically healthy relationship between a free press and the people who are
served by it than outraged protests against bias, unfairness and other
similar abuses. Of course, neither the abuse nor the outrage is valuable;
what is important is that the press is free to err (which is merely to say
that it is free to commit itself) and the people are sufficiently aware to
sense the error.
The access doctrine and the regulatory structure which it necessarily implies threaten that relationship in both of its essential parts. To
insist on a balanced diversity in the press is to diminish its capacity for
good as well as bad. But the effect goes beyond that. The dangerous
quality of the access doctrine lies in the suggestion that the media can
be "made safe for democracy" if we will merely trust others-the regulators-to do the job. The problem is not so much that they will not
succeed but rather the romantic naivete that entertains the notion that
they may. It is an innocence which is dangerous, rather than merely
foolish, because it can be gained only at the expense of the skepticism
which is the single reliable defense against abuse of freedom of the press.
To the extent that the people doubt the media, the manipulative power
317

Cf Jaffe, supra note 21, at 787-92.
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of the media is correspondingly slight. It is only when the guard is
relaxed, when the assumption is made that something meaningful has
been done to eliminate the media "problems," that whatever latent
influence may inhere in the relationship between mass media and a mass
urban society can make itself felt. The access doctrine, which poses as
a new solution to the old problem of imbalance in the press, carries with
it the very real threat of undoing the "good sense of the American
public" on which Professor Jaffe quite correctly relies.
It is no answer to suggest that that skepticism can be redirected
toward the regulators. In the first place, the suggestion is unrealistic in
its own terms. The perennial experience of American regulation has
been that one of its clearest costs is the assumption that it works. 4
Even when the regulatory process does not satisfy, the resulting discontent is likely to be directed toward the process itself rather than toward
the underlying circumstances which may make regulation inherently
unsatisfactory. The FCC's fairness doctrine is a classic example of this
phenomenon. If a single general statement can be made with some
certainty about the fairness doctrine, it is that it pleases no one, not the
public nor the broadcaster nor even the FCC. I do not find this surprising since nearly all that may be said against the access doctrine applies
in some degree to the fairness doctrine as well.349 Yet for more than
twenty years, the main focus of attention has been on how to perfect
the doctrine rather than on the distinct possibility that the doctrine itself
is essentially hopeless.350 I suppose this has produced a kind of skepticism as a by-product of the discontent. But it is not the kind best
calculated to lead individuals to bear the immediate responsibility of
assessing broadcast content for themselves. It is instead a misdirected
skepticism which still supposes that the real burdens of judgment belong
to the regulators and the regulated who must simply be made to do their
jobs.

In any case, there is little advantage in replacing editors with regulators if the regulators themselves cannot be trusted-if, indeed, in order
to insure that the regulators do not abuse their trust, it is necessary to
impose still further restrictions that have the effect of limiting the ability
of the press to take a decided stand on any issue and consolidating the
3'Cf. Coase, Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Radio and Television Broadcasting:
Social and Economic Issues, 41 J. LAND P.U. ECON. 161 (1965).
"'See, e.g., Blake, supra note 21, at 82-86; Robinson, supra note 21, at 159-62; Sullivan, supra
note 21, at 748-52.
'-GCf. Mallamud, supra note 5.
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media centrism which is the very occasion for complaint in the first
place. The equation is surreal, and yet that is the nature of the exchange
which the access doctrine offers.
The net effect of the proposals for an enforceable right of access
to the press will not be to increase effective public debate in a meaningful way. On the contrary, as a practical matter, access will be enforced
only in those cases in which the discussion is relatively "safe." What we
will get will not be diversity; we will only get a somewhat broadened
spectrum of essentially mainstream thinking. We will hear both
sides-but only both sides of the conventional wisdom. Meanwhile, real
dissent-the serious disaffections, the genuine calls for revolution-will
routinely be excluded from the press for reasons already well-embedded
in the law: obscenity, "clear and present danger" tests, and other similar
grounds for perserving the established order intact.
And the result? Simply this: serious dissent, finding itself all the
more isolated, will be all the more desperate to make itself felt. Meanwhile, the American people, whose deep suspicions concerning the mass
media are not unfounded, may succeed in tricking themselves into believing that something meaningful has been accomplished-that the
problems of imbalance are no longer substantial. What will in fact have
been accomplished, however, is something very different: the potential
establishment of a new American orthodoxy and the tyranny of a balanced centrism.
IV.

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

It is clear, of course, that none of the more modest proposals for
access will lead immediately to the extreme results just described. A
reply statute of the sort upheld in Tornillo, for example, will not undo
us by itself. Yet, for the reasons discussed earlier, the statute will have
some "chilling effect" on newspaper discussion of political candidacies
and will provide little measurable practical gain. Indeed, the lesson of
the modest proposals foi access is that practical gain cannot be measured at all. These proposals can be defended meaningfully only if one
retreats to the more general ground of fairness and balance, as the court
does in Tornillo. But that ground is treacherous. It proceeds from little
more than intuition and is difficult to contain: if fairness is accorded to
political candidates, for example, how can it be denied to others? Practically, it cannot, as the continuing evolution of broadcasting's fairness
doctrine demonstrates. Yet if a fairness doctrine were eventually imposed on newspapers, even Professor Emerson, who apparently would
accept the statute in Tornillo, would find the broader requirement in-
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consistent with the first amendment.3 1 The conclusion, then, in the case
of newspapers, seems clear: even the modest proposals must be resisted
in order both to avoid the "chilling effect" that they permit and to
foreclose their expansion into wider and still more obvious first amendment encroachments.
The same objections might be offered to proposals for access to the
broadcast media were it not for existing regulation. The fact of broadcast regulation, however, requires a different set of considerations. For
the present, the decision in Democratic National Committee resolves
the larger first amendment issues in a defensible fashion and leaves the
practical issues arising from the access proposals in the hands of Congress and the FCC. An unqualified right of access to the broadcast
media-a common carrier system, in other words-would be both unattractive and quite possibly unconstitutional for reasons previously discussed. Some limited right might be acceptable, but I think ultimately
it would have to be defended on political, rather than practical, grounds.
A limited right is unlikely to produce any distinct improvement over the
fairness doctrine. It cannot be expected to produce either greater diversity or richer debate, and it seems likely in the long run to produce as
much divisive disappointment as does the fairness doctrine. No doctrine
which requires choices among competing ideas offered by individual
spokesmen can prove very satisfactory. Since, in practice, a right of
access may well raise administrative problems even more complex than
the problems occasioned by the fairness doctrine, 35 2 the desirability of
a right of access to the broadcast media is doubtful.
These observations may suggest less sensitivity to the legitimate
claims of the access proponents than is meant. Insofar as the proponents
of a right of access seek opportunities for members of the public to
speak with a fair chance at persuasion, the search deserves support. The
need for support, however, does not necessarily require direct intervention in the communications process or manipulation of first amendment
doctrine. More directly, if access is unjustifiably denied because the
poor cannot compete on economic grounds with the established media,
the solution may more appropriately lie in a restructuring of the economy than in a rearrangement of traditional and independently valuable
first amendment protections. However these broader economic issues
ought to be resolved, there is little to recommend the proposition that
5
3"
See text accompanying note 317, supra.
52
' See Jaffe, supra note 21, at 787-89.
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all ideas must be expressed in the mass media. Abstractly the proposition is attractive; as a practical reflection of legal doctrine, it would
destroy more than it would yield.
It is nonetheless possible to conclude this article with a degree of
cautious optimism. In my earlier discussion, I have dealt with cable
television only in passing. The most challenging issues posed by cable
television are yet to be resolved and are substantially beyond the scope
of an article addressed mainly to the question of access to the established mass media. Yet cable television is a new and quite different
medium with almost intoxicating possibilities. Essentially an extensive
variation on the familiar closed circuit television system,cable transmission depends on coaxial cables which are strung from house to house
like telephone wires. No allocation from the electromagnetic spectrum
is necessary; a cable system can expand as demand requires. Each cable
itself can carry as many as sixty channels, and each channel can be
separately and originally programmed; thus cable systems offer rich
prospects for true diversity and real debate at incremental costs more
nearly approximating the costs of pamphleteering than those typically
associated with the mass media. Cable television's very capacity for
diversity means that it will not guarantee an audience to those who
simply demand the right to be heard. 33 But for those who want the
ability to speak with a fair chance to be heard by anyone who may be
interested, cable television can truly prove to be the "television of
abundance." '
3"See J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? 258-59 (1973).
'REPORT OF THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATION, ON THE CABLE: THE

TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE (1971). For a more comprehensive review of the issues posed by access
to cable television, see Botein, supra note 4; Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting,
supra note 5, at 891-902. See also, Note, Cable Television and the FirstAmendment, supra note

